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Corporate Complicity:
From Nuremberg to Rangoon'
An Examination of Forced Labor

Cases and Their Impact
on the Liability of
Multinational Corporations
By

Anita Ramasastry*
"Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned.
They therefore do as they like."
-Edward, 1st Baron Thurlow,
English Jurist and Lord Chancellor (1731-1806)
2

INTRODUCTION

Can multinational corporations (MNCs) violate the law of nations? If so,
3
how should nation-states deal with them when they are perpetrators? In recent
1. Rangoon is the capital city of Burma. Myanmar is the name for Burma in the Burmese
language. The country is currently ruled by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),
which took power in a 1988 coup, suspending the legislature and the judiciary. In 1989, the
Burmese military government issued a decree that the country be known by the name of Myanmar.
Since then, Burma has been referred to as Myanmar in Burmese government publications. The
name Burma is still very much in use both unofficially and by other nations that do not recognize the
present military government.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Director, Shidler Center for Law, Commerce &
Technology, University of Washington School of Law. The author served as a Senior Legal Advisor
and Attorney for the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland during 1998.
The author would like to thank Professor Richard Buxbaum for his support of her research concerning the Second World War and the current reparations debate, as well as Professor Joan Fitzpatrick
for her guidance. Additional thanks arc due to the Reference Librarians at Gallagher Law Library
and Jess Marden for their unflagging dedication and assistance, and to Professor Walter J. Walsh for
his willingness to listen. Generous assistance for this research was provided by the Helen R. Whiteley Center, Friday Harbor Labs, University of Washington..
2. Although this article includes many textual excerpts, such excerpts are important because
they emphasize the focus that courts (both contemporary and historical) have focused on slave labor
and its status as a violation of the law of nations and also on the role of corporate entities (referred to
as legal persons) as participants in or beneficiaries of such crimes.
3. Multinational corporations, or MNCs, have been defined as corporations with affiliates or
business establishments in more than one country. See W.H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs:
Theory v. Quantitative Analysis 18 HUMAN RIrrs Q. 369 (1996). Other terms that are often used
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years, there has been increasing discussion of the problem of "corporate complicity"'4 with respect to MNC investment activity in countries with repressive
regimes. 5 The investments may involve joint ventures or contractual partnerships with repressive host governments. MNCs may also have physical
presences such as factories or mining operations in the host countries. The term
complicity is used because MNCs are characterized as accomplices to serious
human rights violations perpetrated by host governments. Victims in the host
country typically are unable to seek redress in their own country. The courts are
unable or ill equipped to handle their cases or the host government will not
pursue enforcement against the perpetrators (e.g., security forces or the
military).
There has been a particular focus on MNCs involved in extraction industries. In order to gain access to certain types of natural resources, such as oil and
gas, copper, or diamonds, MNCs may have to partner with a repressive government. 6 MNCs entering into partnerships in so-called "conflict zones" have been
subjected to increasing scrutiny. Some MNC partnerships allegedly have involved serious human rights violations such as forced labor, forced displacement
of local communities, and torture and execution of citizens by government security forces retained to guard MNC project sites. In other instances, MNCs are
alleged to have benefited from a repressive government's policies. For example,
it has been alleged that MNCs have used prisoners as forced laborers to manufacture products in countries with poor human rights records.
In the United States, this heightened scrutiny has resulted in a wave of
litigation against MNCs for violations of public international law under the federal Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). These lawsuits represent an effort of
"home" states to assert jurisdiction over MNCs in an attempt to influence their
behavior overseas and to provide compensation to victims. These lawsuits have
twin compensatory and deterrent aims. Other nations, such as the United King-

when referring to corporations or business entities that transact globally are transnational corporations and multinational enterprises. See P. MucHLiNsri, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE
LAW 12-15 (1995). See also, Detlev F. Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise:A New Challengefor
TransnationalLaw, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739 (1970).
4. One of the earliest groups to use the term "corporate complicity" in its publications was
Human Rights Watch, a leading nongovernmental organization. Human Rights Watch has published
two major reports that focus on investment activities of MNCs and their relationship to human rights
violations. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ENRON CORPORATION: CORPORATE COMPLICITY
IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2002).
5. For a useful overview, see CHRISTOPHER AVERY, AMNESTY INT'L UK, BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF CHANGE (2000), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/
Avery-Report.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
6. See JULIErE BENNErr, INT'L PEACE FORUM, BusINESs IN ZONES OF CoNFLicT-THE
ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL

IN PROMOTING REGIONAL STABILITY (2001), available at http://

www.unglobalcompact.org/un/gc/unweb.nsf/content/Reg-Stability.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
See also, THE ENRON CORPORATION, supra note 3; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL:
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNrnES

(1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigerial

(last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
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dor, have begun to allow suits against parent MNCs for actions of their subsidiaries located overseas.7
What is the legal responsibility of an MNC with operations in a country
where human rights violations are widespread, or where its revenues provide
support for a repressive regime? Should MNCs be liable if their actions assist or
contribute to serious violations of international law by host governments? Furthermore, what type of MNC activity is sufficient to trigger aidor and abettor
liability? The nature and degree of complicity that should give rise to liability
will be a major theme of this article.
Advocates of greater corporate accountability for human rights violations
argue that companies sometimes significantly contribute to a host government's
ability to carry out systematic human rights abuses. MNCs may sometimes precipitate human rights violations by requesting or funding government activities
that lead to such harm. One example is hiring government security forces to
guard a project site. Corrupt governments may use force to subdue local citizens
who object to investment activity. MNC investment may benefit government
officials but worsen the economic situation for the local population. In other
instances, an MNC may invest in a country and knowingly accept the inevitability or likelihood of governmental human rights abuses. Not all of these actions
concerns about
may trigger liability. Industry leaders, consequently, have raised
8
the lack of clarity in the definition of corporate complicity.
This article examines the historical origins of corporate complicity. In particular, it examines the impact of British and American war crimes tribunals
after the Second World War, along with recent civil litigation by forced laborers
seeking restitution from German and Japanese companies for their enslavement
during the war. These cases are historical examples of MNC actions that rose to
the level of egregious violations of international law. These cases also provide
examples of how courts and legislators can develop and apply appropriate civil
and criminal standards for MNC accomplice liability.
At the same time, cases involving corporate complicity during wartime are
not directly analogous to MNC investment activities in modem conflict zones or
in countries that have no internal conflict but that repress the rights of their
citizens. During World War II, German and Japanese corporations directly utilized forced labor in their own factories and operations as part of a governmentindustry partnership. Their direct participation in certain war crimes and crimes
against humanity led to the prosecution of their officers and employees. Today,
MNCs may partner with repressive governments, like companies during World
War II. They are not, however, alleged to be the principal perpetrators of criminal acts. Rather, certain MNCs allegedly have possessed knowledge of and con7. See Lubbe v. Cape, Plc., 1 WLR 1545, 1566-67 (C.A. 2000), available at http://www.
parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd000720/lubbe-1.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2002) (landmark tort case brought by South African plaintiffs against British parent of South
African asbestos company in which House of Lords refused to dismiss the case against the parent on
grounds of forum non conveniens).
8. See, e.g., Gregory Wallance, Falloutfrom Slave-Labor Case is Troubling, 150 N.J. L. J.
896, 24 (1997).
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doned or been complicit in the criminal acts perpetrated by a host government
and its security forces. The acts of the host government allegedly further an
economic joint venture or project with tangible economic benefit flowing to the
MNC.
This article focuses on the liability of MNCs with respect to the use of
forced or slave labor. An analysis of forced labor cases allows us to examine
corporate complicity in a historical as well as contemporary context. Enslavement or forced labor constitutes a violation of certain peremptory norms of international law such that states, individuals, and legal persons are prohibited from
engaging in such conduct. 9 The International Labor Organization (ILO) recently published its first global report on forced and compulsory labor.' 0 The
report highlights the unfortunate reality that forced and compulsory labor is still
a global problem. It further notes that while most leaders in the business and
labor community state that they are committed to ending forced labor practices,
much work remains to be done."
9. See Kadic v. Karadzic,70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) where the Second Circuit held that
participation in the slave trade violates the law of nations when undertaken by private individuals as
well as state actors.
10. 'The growth of forced labour worldwide is deeply disturbing," said ILO Director-General
Juan Somavia in announcing the publication of the report in May. "The emerging picture is one
where slavery, exploitation and oppression of society's most vulnerable members-especially women and children-have by no means been consigned to the past. Abusive control of one human
being over another is the antithesis of decent work." Forced Labour, Human Trafficking, Slavery
Haunt Us Still, 39 WORLD OF WORK (June 2001), available at http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglishl
bureau/inf/magazine/39/human.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2001). See also, DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, STOPPING FORCED LABOUR: GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FoLLow-UP

TO THE

ILO

DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK

(89th

Session of the International Labour Conference 2001), Report I(B), availableat http://www.ilo.org/
declaration (last visited Oct. 8, 2001). The Executive Sunmary reports that:
Wordwide attention to forced labor has increased in recent years through the international appeals to one country in particular (Myanmar) to rectify that persistent problem. Trafficking of women and children-mainly for prostitution and domestic
service but also sweatshop work-has also increased dramatically throughout the
world in the last ten years. In North America, several high-profile cases in sweatshop
industries have resulted in severe penalties and heightened public awareness.
Id. at vii.
11. The ILO Report states:
While many policy statements endorsing the principle of the elimination of all forms
of forced or compulsory labor have been issued by employers' and workers' organizations, the topic has not often been at center stage in their own activities. This may
simply reflect the general lack of interest in forced labour problems within international and national economic forums as a whole, or a lower level of presence in the
economic sectors or geographical areas where the phenomena are most often found
...The subject matter itself may seem rather removed from the daily concern of
organized employers. Nevertheless, there have been some recent developments on
both the part of employers' and workers' organizations.
Id. at 86.
Certain industry groups are taking affirmative steps in acknowledging the problem and trying to
eradicate it. See, e.g., Sumana Chatterjee, Chocolate Industry to Target Child Slavery on Cocoa
Farms, TiE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2001, availableat http://www.boston.co... /chocolatejindustry
_to-targetchildslavery-oncocoafarmst.shtm (last visited Oct. 7, 2001). The chocolate industry
announced that it accepted responsibility for labor practices on cocoa farms and will work with other
stakeholders to eliminate child slavery. The industry plan includes the establishment of an indepen-
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This article contends that MNCs should be held liable either civilly or criminally for their complicity in certain types of egregious human rights violations,
including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and enslavement
(often referred to as forced labor).' 2 For purposes of this argument, complicity
is defined as situations in which an MNC "aids and abets" a host government in
carrying out serious human rights abuses. Additionally, this article advocates
that an MNC's knowledge of ongoing human rights violations, combined with
its acceptance of direct economic benefit arising from the violations, and continued partnership with a host government should give rise to accomplice liability.
This article also advocates treating corporate complicity as a universal
problem deserving of attention in international criminal law and human rights
law more broadly, rather than solely with respect to the ATCA. The ATCA is
purely an American statute and as such should not be the sole determinant of
how human rights are defined. Civil liability for MNCs that commit intentional
torts would provide victims with compensation for their injuries. 13 Criminal
sanctions against MNCs, however, may provide a stronger deterrent. Moreover,
it appears, at least at present, that outside the United States, jurisdictional considerations favor prosecuting an MNC under international criminal law rather
than civil law.
The heightened emphasis on MNCs does not mean that we should absolve
host states of their responsibility to uphold and protect human rights. The duties
imposed by international humanitarian law fall primarily to governments. Governments are required to act consistently with human rights principles and to
ensure that private actors also comply. A government adhering to this duty will
often enact and enforce laws that prohibit others from abridging the human
rights of its citizens.
A government might set out laws, for example, prohibiting child labor as a
way of protecting the rights of children from infringement by other private actors. Through such legislation, non-state actors, including businesses, become
duty-holders. Corrupt governments, however, may fail to protect human rights
and to ensure that other parties do not violate human rights. The absence of
government action does not nullify the existence of human rights and the duties
of non-state actors to respect such rights.
MNCs, like individuals, have an important role to play in protecting and
promoting human rights. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that, "every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
dent monitoring system in the cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast to ensure that cocoa is not picked by
child slaves.
12. As discussed below, there are situations in which an MNC might be liable for a second
class of crimes in which the MNC acts "under color of law" such that it is deemed to be engaged in
state action. Thus, in some circumstances, private actors, including MNCs, may be accountable
when they are complicit with public (state) actors through the coercive use of state power. See Beth
Stephens, CorporateAccountability: InternationalHuman Rights LitigationAgainst Corporationsin
U.S. Courts, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
(Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).

13.

UNDER

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

216

See William Schabas, Enforcing InternationalHumanitarian Law: Catching the Accom-

plices, 83 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 439, 453 (2001).
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Declaration in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect
for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and interna14
tional, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance."'
To the extent that individuals have rights and duties under customary international law and international humanitarian law, MNCs as legal persons have
the same set of rights and duties, and hence limited international legal personality. 15 This is not to say that we should focus exclusively on the actions of
MNCs and forget about the role of states with respect to human rights. Rather,
it is to say that as MNCs have an increased role in the global economy, so too do
they have increasing rights and duties.' 6 In order to deter MNCs from facilitating or participating in very serious human rights violations, we need to develop
standards that will discourage them from doing so. At the same time, solutions
should be circumscribed to deal with the most serious of harms.
Some commentators and critics may ask: Why penalize a corporate actor
when nations and international tribunals have the ability to prosecute individual
employees for wrongdoing? This debate is not new. Many nations have dealt
with the issue of how to handle domestic corporate crime.' 7 While individuals
may be prosecuted and removed from a corporation, the corporate entity continues to exist and might continue its misconduct.' 8 Prosecuting an individual may
not deter the behavior of the corporation as a whole. Conversely, prosecuting an
MNC may not deter an individual's criminal conduct.19 A parallel approach to
the problem of MNC complicity is therefore necessary. 20 In addition, sanctioning the MNC with fines, criminal prosecution, and even prohibiting future business operations may provide a greater deterrent for MNCs than the isolated
prosecutions of individuals.21
14.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.

No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948); see also, BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 24-32 (Ballantine Books 1995).
15. See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law
Over Legal Persons, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 12, at 189-90.
16. See id.
17. See CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2001). Wells discusses
corporations with respect to the commission of regulatory offenses and also conventional crime.
Wells notes that the recognition of corporations as legal persons (as a capital pooling device) has
afforded them certain protections without the imposition of corresponding obligations or
responsibilities.
18.

See BRENT FiSSE ANDr JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY

39 (1993).
19. See id. Fisse and Braithwaite discuss the problem of individuals being shielded from responsibility when the corporation takes the rap. Id. at 14.
20. See id. at 131-57.
21. This article does not address what type of sanction provides the greatest deterrence for
corporate actors. There are a wide variety of financial and non-financial sanctions that can be imposed on a corporation, including monetary fines, equity fines, direct restitution to victims, corporate
dissolution, adverse publicity, community service, and punitive injunctions. See WEuS, supra note
17, at 33-39. Wells notes that preventive and non-financial sanctions may have a greater deterrent

effect than financial sanctions. Fisse and Braithwaite note that sanctions are appropriate, but only if
the private justice system is not able to come up with its own plan for remedial action. See FissE
AND BRArrTWArrE, supra note 18, at 15.
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Decision-making within a modem MNC may involve multiple persons
whose activity leads collectively to human rights violations. The sum of the
activity as a whole is egregious. It may be difficult to apportion individual responsibility.22 The actions of an individual perpetrator or group of perpetrators,
when facilitated through a large corporate enterprise, may also create greater
harm than an individual acting alone. The public often blames a corporation for
misconduct as opposed to focusing on an individual employee. 23 Finally, a collective or communitarian view of complicity would suggest that at some level,
the effects of corporate wrongdoing should be bome by the corporate entity and
hence, ultimately its shareholders.2 4
Other critics may ask whether the debate over corporate complicity is
purely academic. First, new international guidelines and principles for MNCs
that focus on human rights obligations are being developed by organizations
such as the United Nations.25 These guidelines refer to corporate complicity but
do not adequately define the concept. To the extent that such guidelines may
become binding, it is important to define the parameters of conduct that should
be prohibited pursuant to such codes or principles. 26 Moreover, the increased
focus on intemational criminal law and universal jurisdiction is recent and therefore, the status of legal persons within these spheres is even more recent in
origin. While the debate over when and how to impose civil and criminal liabil22. See id. at 27. Fisse and Braithwaite also discuss the problems inherent in trying to aggregate the liability of individual actors.
23. See id. at 25. We do not, for example, state that Director "Y" of Company "X" was
responsible for child labor problems or sweatshop conditions overseas. Rather, we tend to discuss
the responsibility of Company "X" for the problem.
24. See CHRISTOPHER Kuirz, COMPLICITY: ETmics AND LAw FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 204-53
(2000).
25. The United Nations Subcommission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights is
responsible for drafting the principles. Commentary to the draft principles discusses the issue of
corporate complicity:
Business enterprises shall inform themselves of the human rights impact of their principal activities and major proposed activities, so that they can avoid complicity in
human rights abuses. Business enterprises shall have the responsibility to ensure that
their business activities do not contribute directly or indirectly to human rights
abuses, and that they do not knowingly benefit from these abuses. Businesses shall
further refrain from activities that would undermine the rule of law as well as governmental and other efforts to promote and ensure respect for human rights, and shall use
their influence in order to help promote and ensure respect for human rights. Governments may not use the Principles as an excuse for failing to take action to protect
human rights, for example, through the enforcement of existing laws.
Draft Universal Human Rights Guidelinesfor Companies, Addendum 2, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/
2002/X/Add. 1.E/CN.4/Sub2/2002/WG.2/WP. l/Add.1, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
links/principlesl 1-18-2001.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2002). See also, Principle 2 of the United Nations Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/un/gc/unweb.nsf/content/
prin2.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002) (noting that "the Secretary-General has asked world business to
make sure their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses")
26. Margaret Jungk recommends that a company take action when a host government "is perpetrating planned, systematic, and continuous violations of fundamental human rights and the company maintains a direct connection to those violations." Margaret Jungk, A Practical Guide to
Addressing Human Rights Concernsfor Companies Operating Abroad, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSE OF TRANSNATIONAL

1999).

CORPORATIONS

171, 178 (Michael K. Addo ed.,
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ity on legal persons is new, there is still an emerging emphasis on creating standards for such determinations. The concept of complicity proposed in this
article is meant to be narrowly tailored and relates only to serious violations of
international law.
Still others may fear that advocating MNC liability will open the floodgates
for litigation in the United States and perhaps criminal prosecution elsewhere.
As noted above, corporate complicity, as discussed herein, relates only to the
most egregious violations of international law. The Second World War gives us
a framework from which to analyze what sort of actions give rise to culpability.
The notion that an MNC might be sued or prosecuted does not mean that states
will choose to do so with frequency.2 7
With respect to civil liability, plaintiffs still need to establish personal jurisdiction for a corporate defendant. In common law jurisdictions, the doctrine of
forum non-conveniens also provides protection for corporate defendants.2 8
Some advocates argue that in the United States, for example, forum non-conveniens has resulted in many lawsuits being dismissed, never to be brought in
the host country jurisdiction where the MNC subsidiary is located.29
Part I of this article outlines various levels of corporate complicity as a way
of understanding the spectrum of conduct for which MNCs have been criticized.
This provides a necessary background for examining how courts have treated
corporate actors with respect to their alleged involvement in war crimes and
crimes against humanity. This also helps to delineate where on this continuum
MNC conduct should give rise to accomplice liability.
Part II of this article examines the post-World War II trials of German and
Japanese civilian businessmen for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
war crimes prosecutions provide an important starting point for developing a
modem conception of corporate complicity. After the war, a group of major
industrialists were prosecuted by the United States Military Tribunal (USMT)
for their companies' use of slave labor. Similarly, a group of Japanese mining
officials were also prosecuted by a British military court concerning forced labor
activities in Formosa. These cases establish that there can be legal conse27. See Schabas, supra note 13, at 451.
28. Forum non-conveniens is a common law doctrine that allows a court to dismiss a civil
lawsuit when there is proper personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue, and when
dismissal would serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice. The doctrine has been
significant in cases where the alternative forum is a foreign court as opposed to another court within
the United States. Only defendants may invoke the doctrine. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act states that "when the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part
on any condition that may be just." Uniform Interstate and International Procedural Act, 13 U.L.A.
§ 1.05 (2000).
29. See Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens
in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA J. INT'L L. 41 (1998); David W. Robertson and Paula K.
Speck, Access to State Courts in TransnationalPersonalInjury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and
Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937 (1990); Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket
Home: The FederalDoctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the InternationalPlaintiff,77 CORNELL
L. REV. 650 (1992).
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quences to cooperation between economic actors and repressive governments,
including prosecution for international crimes.
Part III focuses upon recent litigation brought by civilian victims interned
in Nazi and Japanese concentration camps who were forced or slave laborers30
in mines, factories, and plants owned by private German and Japanese corporations. This section considers the significance of those cases for the future of
international humanitarian law, as well as for the ATCA in the United States.31
Part IV examines the issue of corporate complicity from a contemporary
perspective. In particular, Part IV analyzes a recent case brought in a federal
district court against Unocal Corporation for alleged use of forced labor as part
of its pipeline project in Burma. The Unocal case relies heavily on the trials of
the industrialists by the USMT, as well as the modem forced labor cases. The
case is notable because of two seemingly conflicting opinions. The first judge
who presided in the case issued an opinion that established that Unocal, as an
MNC, could be sued for violations of international law-specifically, for knowing of the Burmese military's use of forced labor and for continuing to retain the
military to provide security despite such knowledge. In a subsequent opinion,
issued by a different judge, the case was dismissed.32 The court found that
Unocal's actions were not sufficient to create liability because Unocal had not
affirmatively sought out forced labor for the pipeline. The two opinions provide
conflicting accounts of what kind of MNC conduct is sufficient to trigger possible liability.
Part V provides a critique of the most recent Unocal decision. In particular,
this section critiques the court's approach to defining corporate complicity and
argues for a different standard for MNCs that operate outside of a wartime
context.
Finally, Part VI argues that in light of recent litigation in the United States,
there should be a further focus on criminal liability for MNCs in home states and
also a renewed focus on how the International Criminal Court might deal with
MNCs and legal persons. This section also notes that an expanded definition of
30. The term slave labor has sometimes been used as well as forced labor. One of the American prosecutors at Nuremberg has noted that the term "slave" in the context of the Nazi slave labor
program is inappropriate because:
The Jewish concentration camp workers were less than slaves. Slavemasters care for
their human property and try to preserve it; it was the Nazi plan and intention that the
Jews would be used up and then burned. The term 'slave' is used in this [book] only
because our vocabulary has no precise word to describe the lowly status of unpaid
workers who are earmarked for destruction.
BENJAMIN FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST FOR COMPENSA-

TION, XVII (1979).

In the recent lawsuits against German corporations, plaintiffs' attorneys have distinguished between slave laborers and forced laborers. The former are concentration camp inmates earmarked for
extermination and the latter are civilians and prisoners of war. The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg never made a distinction and used the term slave labor. See The Nurnberg Tribunal, 6
F.R.D. 69, 123-26 (West 1948) (discussing slave labor policies of the Nazis).
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001). For a description of the ATCA, see note 112, infra, and
accompanying text.
32. Judge Ronald Lew replaced Judge Richard Paez when the latter was elevated to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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corporate complicity should be included in international and national guidelines
governing the conduct of MNCs as another way to deter MNCs from acting as
accomplices.3 3
I.
THE SPECTRUM OF CORPORATE COMPLICITY

Before embarking on a historical analysis of corporate complicity, it is important to define the various ways in which an MNC can be described as complicit in the human rights violations of a host state. In this regard, the terms
"complicity" and "accomplice" are used in a non-legal sense, to define possible
ways in which a corporation may be implicated or linked to human rights abuses
perpetrated by a host government.
A.

InternationalLaw Violations for Which an MNC Might be Implicated

There are several ways in which an MNC might be implicated in violations
of international law or the law of nations. For purposes of discussion, the term
"law of nations" refers to international legal norms that are recognized as universal, obligatory, and definable.3 4 An MNC might be liable: (1) directly for
certain violations, (2) as an accomplice, or (3) as a joint actor who is complicit
in state action that violates international law. Both the second and third types of
liability link back to an analysis of whether the MNC has been an accomplice to
the actions of a government in the context of foreign direct investment.
First, an MNC might be liable for its direct commission of a crime. Under
international law, individuals (natural persons) have a duty not to violate a handful of fundamental or peremptory norms of international law, sometimes referred to as jus cogens norms.35 An individual may be criminally liable for
engaging in crimes such as piracy, aircraft hijacking, enslavement (including
forced labor), genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 36 The Nuremberg and British war crimes trials are important benchmarks. These cases
affirmed the notion that private individuals have certain non-derogable duties
and responsibilities under international law and may be prosecuted for a limited
class of international crimes.
At least in the United States, courts have begun to treat corporations (legal
persons) in the same fashion as private individuals with respect to this class of
33. Corporations have been referred to as legal persons, legal entities, or juridical persons in
many statutes and legal documents. Under the so-called "fiction," the law creates a legal entity
known as a corporation and vests it with certain rights and duties.
34. See Forti v. Suarez Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
35. Jus cogen norms are defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and are
often referred to as "peremptory norms" of international law. These norms are "'accepted and rec-

ognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character."' Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332, 8 I.L.M. 679).
36. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, § 404 (1986); see also, Karadzic,70 F.3d at
239.
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crimes. To the extent that an MNC is directly involved in forced labor, for example, the MNC, or its employees might be liable under international criminal
law. Similarly, however, an MNC would be liable with respect to the category
of offenses that apply to private individuals to the extent that it aids and abets
the actions of a government. In other words, an MNC also might be liable for
aiding and abetting a government's use of forced labor. In order for an MNC to
be liable as an accomplice, however, the MNC would have to be prosecuted as
an aidor and abettor under international criminal law.
A second set of international crimes is only actionable against states. Both
customary international law as well as international treaties impose duties and
obligations only on states for certain crimes. These crimes include, for example,
torture, execution, rape, and forcible displacement. 37 In the United States,
courts have been willing to exercise jurisdiction over individuals (and MNCs)
when the private individuals act under color of law.
For purposes of making this determination, courts have applied jurispru38
dential standards developed when analyzing state action under American law.
Determining whether an MNC acted in concert with a state actor has involved
inquiries into whether the MNC was a joint actor that conspired with the government to commit certain crimes in furtherance of the venture. At least one appeals court has noted that "the [ATCA] does confer subject matter jurisdiction
over private parties who conspire in, or aid and abet, official acts of torture by
one nation against the citizens of another nation." 39 Thus, notions of conspiracy
and aidor and abettor liability exist even for crimes requiring state action.
This article focuses predominantly on how to determine accomplice liability with respect to an MNC's conduct in relation to forced labor, and by implication, violations of international law for which it can be implicated as a legal
person. This analysis is relevant, however, to a general discussion of when an
MNC acts "jointly" with a host government in violation of international law. In
both of these contexts, the MNC is necessarily analyzed as an accomplice rather
than as a principal for purposes of liability. Thus, some of the same facts and
criteria that may trigger accomplice liability may also provide indicia of joint
action between an MNC and a host government.
B.

Typologies of Corporate Complicity

Recently, commentators have attempted to outline different categories of
corporate complicity. 4° The three main categories of complicity are (1) direct
complicity, (2) indirect complicity, and (3) mere presence in a country, coupled
with complicity through silence or inaction.
37. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 243.
38. There is a wide body of case law interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which defines when an
individual has acted under color of state law.
39. Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988).
40. See Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human
Rights Abuses (2001), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Clapham-Jerbi-paper.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2002). See also, Jungk, supra note 26, at 171-83.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

102

1.

[Vol. 20:91

Direct Corporate Complicity

The first category of complicity has been referred to as direct corporate
complicity. This involves an MNC knowingly assisting a state in violating customary international law. 4 1 The MNC may be directly complicit where it "decides to participate through assistance in the commission of human rights abuses
and that assistance contributes to the commission of the human rights abuses by
another."'4 2 The MNC need not wish the criminal results but the corporation and
43
its employees and agents must know of the "likely effects of their assistance."
Characterizations of direct complicity, however, are somewhat contingent on
notions of accomplice liability since what constitutes direct participation still
must be defined.
As discussed in Parts II, III, and IV, infra, German and Japanese corporations that used forced labor during World War II fall into the category of direct
accomplices. In many instances, these companies sought out, or affirmatively
utilized, forced laborers in their business operations and knew of the consequences of their actions.
2.

Indirect Corporate Complicity

The broader and more difficult category to conceptualize is referred to as
indirect complicity or "beneficiary" corporate complicity. In this category, the
MNC is not itself the direct perpetrator of the crimes, but it benefits from human
rights abuses committed by the host government. This category includes MNCs
that have contractual partnerships or joint ventures with host governments and
that stand to benefit from human rights violations committed in relation to the
particular project. An oft-cited example is a situation in which security forces
use repressive measures while guarding MNC facilities or to suppress peaceful
protests.4a As discussed in Part V, infra, Unocal's relationship with the governof an oil pipeline seems to be an
ment of Myanmar with respect to the building
45
complicity.
corporate
indirect
of
example
The spectrum of what might constitute indirect complicity is broad indeed.
On one end of the spectrum, a company may provide economic assistance to a
repressive government in the form of revenues gained as part of a joint venture.
The MNC may know that the host government is engaging in human rights
violations but the links between its investment and the human rights violations
may be more attenuated. Factors that are relevant to a determination of complicity include time or duration of the investment and partnership; the type of financing that is provided by the MNC to the government; the nature of the
business relationship (e.g., highly integrated joint venture with the MNC having
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Clapham and Jerbi, supra note 40, at 3.
Id.at 5.
Id.
See id. at 6.

45.
See THE DANISH HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS PROJECT, DEFINING THE SCOPE OF BUSINESS REsPONsILIrrY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD (2001), available at www.humanrights.dk (last

visited Feb. 7, 2002.
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substantial control versus limited business dealings in the absence of a partnership) and whether the MNC continues to do business with the government once
it knows that there may be human rights abuses associated with the investment.
MNC receipt of the economic benefits of human rights violations may rise
to the level of direct complicity when (1) there is a strong and interdependent
business relationship between the MNC and the host government (i.e., the MNC
hires the security forces or contracts for their services); (2) the MNC is aware of
the human rights violations; and (3) the MNC continues to provide financial
support to the host state and continues to perform under contractual arrangements, particularly in furtherance of a collaborative project or endeavor.
When the above criteria are satisfied, acquiescence becomes action and encouragement. Therefore, indirect corporate complicity may be a misnomer and
beneficiary complicity may be a better term, as the MNC is a beneficiary of
profits or benefits generated in part through human rights violations.
As this article suggests, courts need to balance factors to determine whether
beneficiary complicity has reached such a threshold that an MNC's continued
presence and investment amounts to participation in a criminal enterprise. This
second category of beneficiary complicity might trigger liability for international crimes applicable to private individuals, as well as those that require state
action (to the extent that close collaboration in a business venture provides substantial support for a government's violation of human rights in furtherance of
the business venture).
Human Rights Watch describes corporate complicity in a way that collapses the distinction between direct and indirect complicity, when it describes
situations in which "[a] corporation facilitates or participates in government
human rights violations. Facilitation includes the company's provision of material or financial support for states' security forces which then commit human
rights violations that benefit the company. "46
3.

Silence or Inaction in the Face of a Host Government's Human
Rights Violations

While direct complicity is on one end of the spectrum, mere presence in a
country with a repressive political history is another. Companies that had investment and operations in apartheid South Africa, for example, were often criticized for their presence in the country as perpetuating discrimination and racism.
Simply by engaging in business activity in the host country, human rights activists' maintain that companies may unintentionally aggravate human rights violations.47 A counter argument raised by MNCs, however, is that the presence of
foreign companies improves the situation of employees who work for foreign
subsidiaries, as well as for local stakeholders. MNCs also assert that they can
constructively engage a repressive government through their presence and
thereby bring about change in their human rights policies.
46.

See THE ENRON

47.

See Jungk, supra note 26, at 171.
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Human rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) assert that when
MNCs become aware of systematic or continuous human rights abuses, they
have an affirmative obligation to raise these issues with the government and to
attempt to exert influence. Silence or inaction may amount to complicity in that
it implies, at some level, tacit approval for a government's actions rather than
mere neutrality. MNCs are exhorted to speak out in opposition to the human
rights violations and to call for the host government to change its behavior and
practices.4 8
This last category of complicity, relating to the duty to speak is the most
difficult to link to accomplice liability under international law. This is the case
because in this category, human rights violations are often unrelated to the MNC
investment activity itself. Rather, the abuses are part of a more widespread phenomenon within a country. Thus, it is more difficult to maintain that the MNC is
a criminal accomplice simply because its investment activity furthers the ability
of the government to oppress its citizenry generally. MNCs may have a moral
obligation to criticize the practices of the host state but are not directly liable for
the human rights violations of the state.
II.
TRIALS OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS: THE FOUNDATIONS

OF

A.

MNC

LIABILITY

The United States Military Tribunal and German Industry

After the Second World War, the United States Military Tribunal (USMT)
tried several German industrialists. The trials of Nazi era industrialists for using
forced labor during the Holocaust and the prosecution of Japanese mining company officials provide support for the capacity of courts to adjudicate criminal
and civil cases in which corporate officials are accused of committing human
rights abuses. In addition, the World War II prosecutions provide useful text for
understanding how a corporate entity also might be held legally responsible.
Thus, there is case support for imposing liability on legal persons for violations
of international humanitarian law despite the historic reluctance of some jurisdictions to do so.
Often, we instinctively think that it is inconceivable that an MNC would be
capable of engaging in war crimes or crimes against humanity. Similarly, it is
difficult to imagine penalizing an MNC for such conduct if it did occur. One
important question to ask therefore, is if the actions of German or Japanese
corporations during the Second World War occurred today, how would we respond? Moreover, to the extent that we would prosecute an individual for such
crimes, why would we hesitate to similarly penalize the corporation for the same
conduct? Starting with World War II as a baseline aids us in thinking about
See Clapham and Jerbi, supra note 40, at 7. See also, CHRIS AVERY, BusINSs AND
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/
Chapterl.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
48.

HUMAN RiGHTs IN A TIME OF CHANGE (1999),
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what other factual situations might give rise to liability or public criticism and
condemnation.
After Germany's defeat, the Allied powers formed a Control Council composed of four representatives of the victorious powers: The United States, Great
Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. In order to provide a uniform basis for the trial
of war criminals in the various occupied zones, the Control Council enacted
Law No. 10, which designated international crimes that were prosecutable offenses. Pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, the Americans established six
military tribunals within the American Zone of Occupation and conducted
twelve trials before American judges. Three of the trials involved the prosecution of German industrialists.
A parsing of the judgments rendered at Nuremberg by the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) and the USMT involving industrialists and other commercial actors reveals an underlying implication that the corporations for which
they worked had also committed international war crimes. 4 9 At Nuremberg, the
IMT did not try any industrialists for their use of forced labor. Subsequently,
however, the USMTt did try executives from three German firms: I.G. Farben,
5
Flick, 50 and Krupp.
These decisions also discuss whether an affirmative defense of duress or
necessity was applicable for defendants accused of engaging in forced labor.52
See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and InternationalHuman Rights 31
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 423 (noting that the trial of corporate officers from the German company I.F. Farben by the USMT "bases much of its factual findings on the role of Farben as a corporate entity or corporate personality." See also, Clapham, supra note 15, at 166-71. For an historical
account of I.G. Farben's wartime activities, see PETER HAYES, INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGY: I.G.
FARBEN IN THE NAZi ERA (1987).
50. Friedrich Flick was a leading German industrialist who owned steel plants in Germany.
Flick was tried along with five members of the Flick concern for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including the enslavement and abuse of concentration camp inmates. Flick was convicted
of using slave labor because of his knowledge and approval of certain activities of his deputy, Bernhard Weiss. Weiss "took an active and leading part in securing and allocating Russian prisoners of
war for use in the work of manufacturing increased quotas" in one of Flick's plants. Flick has been
described as someone who "at the height of his career ... had voting control of a dozen companies,
employing at least 120,000 persons engaged in mining coal and iron, making steel, and building
machinery and other products which required steel as raw material." The Flick Case, VI TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE Tr NUREMBERG MILrrARY TRIBUNALS 1192 (1952). See Doe I v. Unocal,
110 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 2000). See also, L.M. Stallbaumer, FrederickFlick's Opportunism and Expediency, 13 DUIENSIONS: A JOURNAL OF HOLOCAUST SruDIES, available at http://
www.adl.org/braun/dim_13_2_flick.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001); FERENCZ, supra note 29, at 15670.
51. See Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The "Other Schindlers," 9 TEMPLE INT'L & Comp. L. J. 173, 229-49 (1995).
52. I refer to the defense of "necessity" and "duress" interchangeably throughout this article.
The terms "duress" and "necessity" have different meanings in the context of the common law.
Necessity in common law is seen as a justification where a defendant is presented with a choice of
two evils and must choose the lesser of two. Duress, by contrast, is referred to as an excuse. The
defendant knows that the conduct in which he or she engaged was wrong but the defendant's own
will or volition was overcome due to threats of death or serious bodily harm. See Joshua Dressier,
Exegesis of the Laws of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searchingfor its Proper Limits, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1335-57 (1989); Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A PhilosophicalAccount of the
Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 251, 254 (1995). German law, by contrast, refers to the defense of
necessity, but defines necessity in relation to human coercion. See Herbert Schumann, Criminal
49.
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The Farben Case-An Early Example of Corporate Complicity

In 1947, twenty-three employees of I.G. Farben were indicted for plunder,
slavery, and complicity in aggression and mass murder. 53 I.G. Farben was a
major German chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturer. The defendants in
the Farben case were prosecuted for "acting through the instrumentality of
Farben" in the commission of their crimes.54 Five of the Farben directors were
held criminally liable for the use of slave labor. 55 This was the first time that a
court attempted to impose56 liability on a group of persons who were collectively
in charge of a company.
The USMT based much of its findings on the role of Farben as a corporate
entity.The Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over legal persons and therefore
could not render a verdict against Farben itself. Nonetheless, the decisions focus
quite clearly on the nature of the corporation and its role in perpetrating certain
crimes. Farben is portrayed as the instrumentality through which individual actors were able to collectively engage in criminal acts. As the USMT noted:
While the Farben organization, as a corporation, is not charged under the indictment with committing a crime and is not the subject of prosecution in this case, it
is the theory of the prosecution that the defendants individually and collectively
used the Farben organization as an instrument b and through which they committed the crimes enumerated in the indictment."'
The indictment charged that Farben, "through its foreign and economic policy, participated in weakening Germany's potential enemies and that Farben carried on propaganda, intelligence, and espionage activities for the benefit of the
Reich."'58 The Tribunal noted, furthermore, that the action of private entities
(including legal persons) had to be scrutinized under different rules. The Tribunal stated, "certainly where the action of private individuals, including juristic
persons, is involved, the evidence must go further and establish that a transacin form is not voluntarily entered into because of
tion otherwise apparently legal
59
the employment pressure."
Law, in INTRODUCTION To GERMAN LAW 383, 392-93 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin, eds.,
Kluwer Law Int'l 1996). The International Military Tribunal and USMT both refer to the defense of
necessity but appear to use it in a mixed fashion to refer both to duress and necessity. For example,
in discussing the concept of necessity, the USMT states that necessity has also been referred to as
compulsion, force and compulsion, and coercion and compulsory duress. See United States v.
Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS at 1436.
53.

See U.S. v. Krauch, et. al, The LG. FarbenCase, VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
iii-iv (1952) [hereinafter "The .G. Farben Case"].

nnE NUJREMBERG MILrrARY TRIBUNALS,

Id. at 14.
See id. at 1081, 1205-09.
See Ramasastry, supra note 49, at 423 (1998).
The LG. Farben Case, supra note 53, at 1108 (emphasis added).
Id. The Tribunal notes, at another point in the decision:
Farben marched with the Wehrmacht and played a major role in Germany's program
for acquisition by conquest. It used its expert technical knowledge and resources to
plunder and exploit the chemical and related industries of Europe, to enrich itself
from unlawful acquisitions, to strengthen the German war machine and to assure the
subjugation of the conquered countries to the German economy.
Id. at 1128-29.
59. Id. at 1140. The Tribunal continued:
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Other examples of how Farben was portrayed as a criminal actor relate to
the company's seizure of property in enemy territory. The Tribunal stated:
With reference to the charges in the present indictment concerning Farben's activities in Poland, Norway, Alsace Lorraine and France, we find that the proofestablished beyond a reasonable doubt that offences against property as defined in
Control Council Law No. 10 were committed by Farben, and that these offences
were connected with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for occupied
countries as above described. 6°

Although limits on the USMT's jurisdiction precluded it from holding
Farben liable for the use of slave labor, the USMT found that, as a corporate
entity, Farben had violated Article 47 of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and
Customs of War. Because of Farben's liability, individual directors could be
convicted by virtue of their affiliation with Farben. 6 1 In the Tribunal's
assessment:
The result was the enrichment of Farben and the building of its greater chemical
empire through the medium of occupancy at the expense of the former owners.
Such action on the part of Farben constituted a violation of rights of private
property, protected by the Laws and Customs of War. And in the instance involving private properly, the permanent acquisition was in violation of the Hague
Regulations which limits the occupying power to a mere usufruct of real estate.
The forms of the transactions were varied and intricate, and were reflected in
corporate agreements well calculated to create the illusion of legality. But the
spoliation stands out, and there can be no uncerobjective of pillage, plunder and
62
tainty as to the actual result.

As part of its decision, the Tribunal also noted that Farben, as a corporate
entity, had been directly involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity.
For example, the Tribunal stated, "Auschwitz was financed and owned by
Farben... The Auschwitz construction workers furnished by the concentration
camp lived and labored under the shadow of extermination ..."63
In some instances, following confiscation by Reich authorities, Farben proceeded to
acquire permanent title to the properties it has confiscated. In other instances involving "negotiations," with private owners, Farben proceeded permanently to acquire
substantial or controlling interests in property contrary to the wishes of the owners,
forceful seizure of property by the Reich, or other similar measures, such, for example, as withholding licenses, raw materials, the threat of uncertain drastic treatment in
peace-treaty negotiations, or other effective means of bending the will of owners.
The power of the military occupant was the ever-present threat in these transactions
and was clearly an important, ifnot decisive, factor.
60. Id. at 1141.
61. See Hague Regulations Annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Law and Customs
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 47, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. See also, Article 33 of the
Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538.
62. The .G.Farben Case, supra note 53, at 1140 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 1183-84. It should also be noted, however, that the Tribunal focused on individual
responsibility with respect to forced labor at Auschwitz:
The defendants most closely connected with the Auschwitz construction project bear
great responsibility with respect to the workers. They applied to the Reich Office for
Labor ... Responsibility for taking the initiative in the unlawful employment was
theirs, and, to some extent at least, they must share the responsibility for mistreatment
of the workers with the SS and the construction contractors ...The use of concentra-
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Perhaps the most definite expression of the Tribunal's focus on the actions
of the corporate entity was the court's reference to legal persons:
Where private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the mili-

tary occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent of the
former owner, such action not being expressly justified by any applicable provision of the Hague Regulations, is in violation of international law. The payment
of a price of other adequate consideration does not, under such circumstances,
relieve the act of its unlawful character. Similarly, where a private individual or a
juristicperson becomes a party to unlawful confiscation of public or private property by planning and executing a well-defined design to acquire such property
permanently, acquisition under such circumstances subsequent
6 4 to the confiscation
constitutes conduct in violation of the Hague Regulations.
2.

The Krupp Firm

In addition to the prosecution of Farben managers, the USMT prosecuted
industrialists from the Krupp firm. The Krupp case involved the prosecution of
twelve defendants for commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity
with respect to plunder and spoliation of civilian property and factories in occupied territories, and also in the deportation of and use of prisoners of war and
concentration camp inmates as forced laborers in various Krupp factories in
Germany. 65 Eleven of the twelve defendants were convicted and sentenced by
the USMT.
As with the Farben case, the Krupp decision is instructive concerning the
possible attribution of criminal liability to MNCs. The decision discusses the
actions of individuals but often only after a lengthy and detailed explication of
the actions of the Krupp firm as the prime actor and perpetrator of the various
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The Krupp case underscores the possibility that in certain instances, it is the
actions of the enterprise rather than individual defendants that appears criminal.
For example, the Krupp firm, through multiple employees and officers, engaged
in systematic plunder and spoliation through its acquisition and removal of proption camp labor . . at Auschwitz with the initiative displayed by the officials of
Farben in the procurement and utilization of such labor, is a crime against humanity.
Id. at 1185-87.
Farben was sued after the war but was initially unreceptive to a forced laborer's restitution
claims. After the end of the war, a lawsuit brought by a Farben laborer at Auschwitz, Norbert
Wollheim, in a German court, also highlighted the role of Farben as a corporate actor and its civil
liability for unpaid wages. Farben argued that the SS, the Nazi Party, the German state, or subcontractors were responsible for the damages Wollheim sought. Farben also stated that had it not employed inmates, they would have been killed even sooner. The Frankfurt court concluded that
Farben was liable for its negligence in failing to protect the life, body, and health of the plaintiff.
Farben eventually settled with Wollheim and with the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Against Germany to compensate forced laborers who had been employed by Farben at Auschwitz.
Farben agreed to pay no more than DM 30 million of which 10 percent would be reserved for nonJewish claimants. See FERENCZ, supra note 30, at 34-38. (citing the Decision in Wollheim v. I.G.
Farben in Liquidation, Frankfurt District Court, June 10, 1953, court file no. 2/3/0406/51. Id. At 37,
n. 9).
64. The LG. Farben Case, supra note 53, at 1132-33.
65. The Krupp Case, supra note 52.
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erty in France, Alsace, and the Netherlands. The actions of the firm come to the
fore as opposed to decisions or conduct of any individual worker.
According to the USMT, the Krupp concern originated with the business
known as Fried. Krupp, founded in 1821.66 The concern was converted into a
German corporation in 1903'and became known as Fried. Krupp. A.G. 6 7 Krupp
A.G. was a private, limited liability company. 68 Bertha Krupp, the mother of
the defendant, Alfried Krupp, initially owned nearly all of the shares of this
company. 69 In December 1943 Fried. Krupp. A.G. was dissolved and in accordance with the provisions of the "Lex Krupp," a special Hitler decree, the defendant Alfried Krupp became the sole owner. 70 After December 1943, the
unincorporated privately owned concern, owned and controlled directly and
two subsidiary
through holding companies, mines, steel and armament plants,
71
operating companies, shipyards, and a machinery factory.
Under count two of the USMT's indictment, ten of the defendants were
charged with plunder and spoliation amounting to war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 72 The Krupp defendants were charged "in the plunder of public and
private property, exploitation, spoliation, devastation, and other offenses against
property and the civilian economies of the countries and territories which came
under the belligerent occupation of Germany in the course of its invasions and
wars." 73 Six of the defendants were found guilty under count two. 7 4 The Tribunal, in its judgment, described the actions of defendants as "[h]aving exploited,
as principals or as accessories, in consequence of a deliberate design and policy,
territories occupied by German armed forces in a ruthless way, far beyond the
needs of the army of occupation and in disregard of the needs of the local
' 75
economy.
At the outset of its decision, the Tribunal discussed the Krupp firm's acquisition of property in France. The Krupp firm took over production at the Austin
factory in Liancourt, France. This tractor factory was previously owned by Robert Rothschild, a Yugoslavian Jew, who had purchased the plant 1939. In 1940,
the factory was confiscated by the German army after the German occupation.76
The Krupp firm, in contravention of the Hague Regulations, purchased the Austin plant from the German administrator of Jewish properties, without compensation being made to the original owner.
66. See id. at 1332.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. The relevant law relating to plunder and spoliation was contained in Articles 46-54 of the
Hague Regulations of 1907 stating, for example, that "private property ... must be respected," and
cannot be confiscated" (Article 46); "pillage is formally forbidden" (Article 47). Hague Regulations, supra note 61.
73. The Krupp Case, supra note 52, at 467.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1338.
76. See id at 1349.
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As with the Farben decision, the Tribunal states that the firm itself violated
the Hague Regulations in its seizure and confiscation of property in occupied
countries. In remarking on Krupp's actions in France, the Tribunal noted, "
[t]he correspondence between the Kruppfirm and the Paris office show the avidity of the firm to acquire the Austin factory and the Paris property."7 7 The
Tribunal stated:
We conclude from the credible evidence before us that the confiscation of the
Austin plant based upon German-inspired anti-Jewish laws and its subsequent detention by the Kruppfirm constitute a violation of Article 48 of the Hague Regulations which requires that the laws in force in an occupied country be respected;
that it was also a violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations which provides
that private property must be respected; that the Krupp firm, through defendants
Krupp, Loeser, Houdremeont Mueller, Janssen and Eberhardt, voluntarily and
without duress participated
in these violations ...and that there was no justifica7
tion for such action. s
The Krupp firm also leased an office in Paris as its French headquarters.
Rather than leasing or purchasing property from a non-Jewish owner in Paris,
the Krupp firm chose to profit form the anti-Jewish policy of the Nazi regime
and leased a property on the Boulevard Haussmann that had been seized by the
Commissioner for Jewish Affairs. 79 In describing this transaction, the USMT
noted, "[t]his example of the Krupp firm's exploitation of the Nazi anti-Jewish
policy is most objectionable because there was nothing to prevent the firm 80
from
honestly leasing or buying a building from a non-Jewish owner in Paris."
Krupp also seized and plundered various plants and manufacturing facilities in order to provide its German facilities with adequate machinery and supplies. The USMT found that "the Krupp firm not only took over certain French
industrial enterprises. It also considered occupied France as a hunting ground
for additional equipment which was either shipped to the French enterprises operated by 8 the Krupp firm or directly sent to Krupp establishments in
Germany." '
In the Netherlands, the Krupp firm, through its Dutch subsidiaries, participated in a wholesale seizure and confiscation of materials that it had previously
sold to municipal boards of work, gas works, municipalities, and private firms.
Krupp participated in the confiscation and transport of seized goods and machinery. The third phase of the Dutch confiscation took place between November
1944 and May 1945 and was described as the "systematic plunder of public and
private property. '' 82 Krupp took, from one factory alone, twenty-one freight
77. Id. at 1351 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1351-52. The Krupp firm also engaged in permanent acquisition of and then subsequent looting of a textile factory in Alsace. See id. at 1355. The USMT noted that "from a careful
study of the credible evidence, we conclude that there was no justification under the Hague Regulations for the seizure of the [Alsatian] property and the removal of the machinery to Germany."
Rather, the USMT concluded that, "this interference with the rights of private property was a violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations." Id. at 1357.
79. See id. at 1350.
80. Id. at 1351.
81. Id. at 1361.
82. Id. at 1365.
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cars of machines and materials for its factories in Essen, Germany. 83 While
ascribing liability, the USMT once again makes reference to the acts of the firm:
We conclude that it has been clearly established by credible evidence that from
1942 onward illegal acts of spoliation and plunder were committed by, and on
behalf of, the Krupp firm in the Netherlands on a large scale, and that particularly,
between about September 1944 and the spring of 1945 certain industries of the
Netherlands were exploited and plundered for the German war effort, in the most
of the local economy, and in consequence of a
ruthless way, without consideration
84
deliberate design and policy.
The USMT was of the opinion that the Krupp firm actively sought to engage in spoliation and plunder. In rendering its opinion, the Tribunal repeatedly
refers to the collective intent of the firm, "[t]here are a number of other such
examples, which make it clear to us that the initiative for the acquisition of
properties, machines, and materials in the occupied countries was that of the
Krupp firm and that it utilized Reich government and Reich agencies whenever
necessary to accomplish its purposes .. .85
Count three of the indictment was entitled "Deportation, Exploitation and
Abuse of Slave Labor."'86 All twelve defendants were charged under count
three.8 7 Eleven of the twelve defendants were convicted. 88 According to the
USMT, the Krupp firm participated extensively in the Third Reich's compulsory
labor program. 89 Krupp utilized the majority of its compulsory labor, which
included prisoners of war, foreign civilians and concentration camp inmates at a
constellation of 80-100 Krupp-owned factories in Essen Germany referred to
collectively as the Cast Steel Factory.
Krupp was alleged to have treated Russian prisoners of war as well as eastern concentration camp inmates the worst of all of the groups. As for Russian
prisoners of war, the Tribunal noted:
[T]wo determinative factors which are established beyond doubt by contemporaneous documents taken from the Krupp files, some of which are quoted hereinabove. These are (1) that Russian prisoners of war were put to heavy work when,
due to undernourishment, they were totally unfit physically, and (2) that not only
83.

See idat 1367.

84. Id. at 1370 (quoting Trial of Major War Criminals, I TRIALS

OF WAR CRMINALS BEFORE

THE NUREMBERG MurrARY TRIBUNALS 239 (1950)).

85. Id. at 1372.
86. Id. at 667.
87. Count three of the indictment charged all of the defendants with violation of Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, paragraphs I(b) and (c) for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Count three also charged the defendants with violations of the laws and customs of war. The relevant charge alleged that defendants participated:
in atrocities and offenses against persons, including: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, abuse and other inhumane acts committed against civilian
populations of countries and territories under belligerent occupation of, or otherwise
controlled by the Third Reich enslavement and deportation of foreign and German
nationals, including, concentration camp inmates, employment of prisoners of war in
war operations, and work having a direct relation to war operations.
Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1374.
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was there no official requirement that90this be done but it was directly contrary to
the orders of the competent officials.
As for the eastern workers, the USMT found that they:
were beaten as part of their daily routine. The beatings took place in the Krupp
plants and in the camps. The victims were beaten by the camp leaders ... and by
ordinary workers. Weapons with which they were beaten were supplied by the
Krupp firm although all foreign workers were subjected to mistreatment, the most
that suffered by the Russian prisoners of war and the
severe and inhumane 9was
1
eastern civilian labor.
Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that there the Krupp firm had purposefully
availed itself of slave labor. The USMT highlighted this decision of the firm
when discussing liability. In 1944, the SS offered concentration camp inmates
to the armaments industry. If armament firms wished to take advantage of this
free labor, they submitted requests. As the USMT noted "[i]t was not a matter
of refusing to accept an allocation. It was up to the enterprises to put in requests. Many armament firms refused. The Krupp firm sought concentration
92
camp labor because of the scarcity of manpower then prevailing in Germany."
The Tribunal rejected the defendants' defense of necessity and stated that
"[tlhe situation at the Berthawerk [one factory Krupp owned] again leads to the
conclusion that the Krupp firm planned its own program upon its desire to use
concentration camp labor.93 Krupp and the other defendants argued that they
would have lost their factories and properties had they refused to use slave labor.
The Tribunal noted that fear of property loss was not sufficient grounds for
invoking necessity. By contrast, the USMT did accept the defense of necessity
for the majority of defendants who worked in the Flick concern (see Section V
infra) because they had feared loss of life for refusing to accept forced labor in
their factories.
The Krupp finm, the Tribunal concluded, had an "ardent desire" to employ
forced labor. In using such a characterization, the Tribunal attributed intent to
the corporate entity as well as the individual defendants. The notion that the
Krupp firm planned, desired, and sought forced labor, or engaged in plunder
and pillage, exemplifies the way in which (1) some criminal acts are the manifestation of planning and execution at the firm level, and (2) courts can attribute
liability to the MNC as well as its employees.
3.

Karl Rasche and the Role of the Financier

Another industrialist who was charged with engaging in slave labor was
Karl Rasche, the Chairman of Dresdner Bank, a private commercial bank in
90. Id. at 1388. The fact that during a substantial part of the war years, Russian prisoners of
war and Italian military internees were required to work in semi-starved conditions is conclusively
demonstrated through documentary evidence taken from the Krupp files, which had been concealed.
Because the evidence on the subject is voluminous, it cannot be discussed in detail, but it leaves no
doubt as to the treatment of the war prisoners and internees.
91. Id. at 1409.
92. Id. at 1412.
93. See id. at 1423.
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Germany that has been characterized as the bank of the Third Reich. 94 Rasche
was the only private banker tried under the Nuremberg Charter. 95 He was
charged with facilitating slave labor on the grounds that he made loans to entities using slave labor. 9 6 The USMT stated, "We cannot go so far as to enunciate
the proposition that the official of a loaning bank is charged with the illegal
operations alleged to have 97resulted from loans or which may have been contemplated by the borrowers."
In the recent litigation brought by Holocaust survivors against Swiss banks,
much was made by the defendant Swiss banks about the language of the Rasche
decision. The banks cite Rasche to demonstrate that the mere act of providing
money or credit to finance criminal activity does not constitute a violation of
customary international
law, even where the bank had knowledge of the purpose
98
for such financing.
When analyzing the spectrum of conduct that may give rise to complicity,
one might analogize the Rasche case to a situation where an MNC may be present in a host country and where its limited investment activity might contribute
to human rights violations. Passive investment or presence in a host county will
not by itself trigger accomplice liability. On the other hand, one might argue
that the Rasche decision itself needs to be tempered by examining the nature of
the relationship between the financier and the criminal perpetrator. If the bank
or banker provides continuous, ongoing and knowing financial support for criminal conduct in the form of loans, why should it not trigger accomplice liability?
One can draw parallels from contemporary rules concerning the liability of individuals and legal persons for money laundering or for financing terrorist activity
as situations in which the knowing provision of financial assistance contributes
to criminal conduct and also triggers liability for the financial activity.
B.

Trials of Other Industrialists:Japanese Mining Company Officials and
the Kinkaseki Mine Prosecutions

Much of the current debate concerning corporate complicity and forced labor has focused on the USMT trials of the German industrialists. Legal commentators have overlooked the trial of employees of the Japanese Nippon
Mining Company for their actions at the Kinkaseki Mine in Formosa during
World War II.
The Kinkaseki Mine trial was held before the British War Crimes Court in
Hong Kong. 99 The nine defendants were all civilian employees of the Nippon
94.

See United States v. Von Weizsaecker (Ministries Case) XIV

TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE NuREMBURG MIurARy TRIBUNALS 621-22 (1952).

95.

See id. For a more detailed account, see Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies, supra note 49, at

414.
96. See Ministries Case, supra note 94, at 852.
97. Id. at 854.
98. See Ramasastry, supra note 49, at 416.
99. The Court consisted of Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Laming (Department of the JAG of India), Major R.S. Butterfield (Indian Grenadier), and Captain K.R. Busfield. The current POW litigation that was recently dismissed by a federal district court in California involved the activities of the
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Mining Company who were accused of mistreating POWs forced to labor in the
mines. Among them was the general manager of the mine, two production managers, a production supervisor, and five foremen. The trial took place in May
1947. The sentences ranged from one to ten years.
The South China Morning Post, a newspaper published in Hong Kong, provided detailed reports of the trials. According to the news reports, there were
three main issues at trial: (1) whether the Army or the Nippon Mining Company
was responsible for accidents to and mistreatment of POWs; (2) whether the
working conditions in the mines were adequate; and (3) how the accused may
have mistreated POWs. There may be court documents available in British government archives, but the author has only been able to locate these news reports,
to date, providing an account of the proceedings.
The reports of the trials are instructive because they show that the war
crimes tribunals in the Far East also grappled with the liability of economic
actors. Moreover, the proceedings provide useful examples of the difficulty that
tribunals face when apportioning liability to private actors and state actors.
As the discussion below illustrates, the British Military court focused a
great deal of attention on whether care for the prisoners (and subsequent mistreatment) was the responsibility of the mining company or of the army. Similar
to the German industrialists, the mining company officials invoked the defense
of necessity. They asserted that in using POW labor in their mining operations,
they were acting under orders from the Japanese Army. The court appeared to
disregard this defense when imposing liability.
Newspaper accounts of the trial are not clear as to why the court reached
the verdict that it did. However, it can be inferred that the court held the mining
company legally responsible for deaths, injuries, and the suffering of the POWs.
This is deduced from the fact that two of the defendants, Toda and Nakamura, a
mining company manager and supervisor respectively, were found guilty, although they did not directly participate in the beatings or mistreatment of the
prisoners. Thus, their guilt was predicated more upon their responsibility as
members of the mining company than as private individuals engaged in human
rights violations.
Nippon Mining Company at Kinkaseki. Nippon Mining Company, a subsidiary of Japan Energy
Corporation, allegedly forced the British POWs to dig copper in Taiwan's Kinkaseki mine. The
POW litigation was commenced in California on behalf of the POWs that were forced to work in the
Kinkaseki mines. The case focused on Arthur Titherington, Henry Blackham, and Fergus McGhie,
men currently in their late seventies or eighties who argue they were given poor food and no medical
care by the company while working in the mine and were subjected to constant vicious beatings.
According to news reports, there are more than five-hundred survivors who worked at Kinkaseki.
See Excavating Japan's Past, ABC NEWS, Feb. 23, 2000, available at http://abnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/slavelabor00223.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). For further accounts of
the experiences of British POWs at the Kinkaseki Mine, see POWs Fight Japan in USA Courts, BBC
NEWS, Feb. 23, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_652000/652633.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2001). One of the plaintiffs in the POW litigation against the Japanese corporations is Arthur Titherington. He has written an account of his experiences. See ARTHUR TrriERINGTON AND ROBERT P. O'NEIL, KINKASEKI: ONE DAY AT A TIME (2001).
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During the trials, the defendants and witnesses from the Japanese Army
argued that when the POWs were working in the mine, the Army was not responsible for their welfare. Two Japanese Army officers on trial before another
War Crimes Court, Colonel Nakano and Captain Imamura, were called as prosecution witnesses in the Kinkaseki Mine Trial. Both testified that the responsibility for the safety of POWs working in the mine lay with the members of the
Nippon Mining Company and not with the staff of the POW camp. They alleged that the Company was also responsible for establishing the work quota and
for supplying POW workers with the necessary equipment for working in the
mine." ° °
Nakano, the Chief Commandant of all POW Camps in Formosa, declared
that his guardianship of the POWs ended at the entrance of the mine and that
the POWs came under the supervision of the Company once they entered the
mine. According to relevant military regulations, the Camp Commandant appointed guards to escort the POWs to the mine. These guards took the POWs to
the entrance of the mine, handed them over to the Company employees and
remained on guard outside the mine. At the end of the day, the Army guards
met the POWs at the entrance of the mine and escorted them back to camp.' 0 '
An affidavit from Colonel Yokoda Hiroshi, former Staff Officer to General
Ando, a Taiwan Army Commander, corroborated Nakano's testimony by stating
that the Company officials and their subordinates were directly responsible for
the conditions in the mine. The Company was responsible for any deaths or
injuries due to accidents or mishaps in the mine and the individual treatment of
POWs by the mining Company's staff.
In his closing address, the prosecutor argued that there was ample evidence
to prove that Company officials, including Toda Mitsugu and Nakamura Katsumi, were entirely responsible for the safety and welfare of the POW laborers
at the mine. According to the prosecutor, the very fact that the defendants took
such pains to explain the measures they implemented to improve the working
conditions showed they felt some responsibility.
Defendant Toda Mitsugu, the manager of the Nippon Mining Company,
claimed that the POWs were at all times under the orders and control of the
POW Camp Commandant. Toda argued that when Japan went to war, the nation was instructed to obey the Army's leadership. He claimed that although he
personally did not wish to employ POWs, he was not in a position to raise any
objection, especially as his predecessor had reached an agreement with the
Army.
Toda stated that during the war, the Company had sufficient laborers to
meet the production demand and that POW labor was therefore superfluous. He
claimed that it was not profitable to use POWs because they were inexperienced
and had to be maintained at the Company's cost. 10 2 Toda alleged that the Army

instructed the mining Company that it was responsible for the POWs' pay and
100.
101.

See Copper Mine Trial, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 13, 1947, at 4.
See In a Copper Mine, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 1947, at 9.

102.

See Formosan Mine, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 14, 1947, at 4.
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other amenities, but that at all times the POWs would be under the orders and
control of the Camp Commandant. Toda added that the mine staff was also told
to report all irregularities to the Camp Commandant. t0 3 Both Toda and Mitsugu's arguments echo those of the German industrialists. They claimed to have
accepted slave labor because they were not in a position to refuse the Japanese
government's request.
According to Toda, Captain Imamura's predecessor told him that the
POWs were not employed at the discretion of the Company as they were prisoners of the Japanese Army. The Camp Commandant organized the POWs into
work parties. The Camp Commandant admonished the work parties that they
were under the Army's control, but should regard the instructions of the Company leaders as coming from the Commandant himself.1t 4
Toda also testified that, as he was not in a position to control the POWs
directly, he did not care much about their safety. Toda maintained that, according to the regulation, the control and guarding of POW workers was the responsibility of the Japanese Army authorities, while the Company was responsible
for teaching the POWS how to mine. He further supported his contentions by
stating that the Camp Commandant
and his staff regularly visited the mine and
05
inspected POWs working there.1
Toda Mitsugu denied having knowledge of the "hanchos"' (foremen) beatings of POWs while he was manager. Toda disclaimed his responsibility for
crimes committed by the hanchos. He testified that he visited the mines about
three times a year and had never witnessed ill treatment. The Camp Commandant never reported any beatings to him and he had no direct contact with the
POWs themselves. The hanchos did not report any beatings to him. Had he
known of ill treatment of POWs, Toda said that he would have cautioned the
6
leaders of the working parties and informed the Camp Commandant.'
A second accused Company official, Nakamura Katsumi, said in his statement that when he took over as production supervisor at the mine, he was informed by Captain Imamura, the POW Camp Commandant, that he was directly
under Imamura's command and must obey his orders. Nakamura was also instructed to stop all beatings in the mine and to prevent the hanchos from punish07
ing POWs, and to report all irregularities directly to the Commandant.1
Nakamura also testified that he understood the Japanese Army to be responsible for POW workers, as it had established a sentry box at the mine entrance. He
testified that although he had heard that beatings and mistreatment of POWs had
taken place prior to entering the mine, he did not know any details of those occurrences. He also stated that he had neither witnessed nor heard any case of beatings or mistreatment during his service in the mine.' 0 8 During cross-examination
103.
104.

See In a Copper Mine, supra note 101, at 9.
See Formosan Mine, supra note 102.

105.
106.
107.
108.

See
See
See
See

Copper Mine Trial, supra note 100.
Formosan Mine, supra note 102.
In a Copper Mine, supra note 101.
id.
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by the prosecution, Nakamura said that he did feel responsible for any lapse of
safety, but 1that
9 preventing misconduct on the part of the hanchos was not part of
his duties. 0
In his closing address, the defense counsel argued that neither Toda nor
Nakamura could be held responsible for the safety and welfare of the POW
laborers forced on them by the Army. Defense counsel also argued that the
safety and welfare of the POWs during work hours remained the responsibility
of the Camp Commandant. POWs were purportedly employed against the
wishes and the advice of the mining company." 0
On May 28, 1947, British War Crime Court Number Five found eight of
the nine accused guilty, including Toda and Nakamura, although neither was
found to have directly participated in the abuse of the POWs. Toda was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and Nakamura was sentenced to five
years. 111
C. Drawing the Line: Developing a Standardfor Corporate Complicity
Based on Previous War Crimes Prosecutions
The prosecution of both German and Japanese company officials establishes the proposition that active and willing participation in the use of forced
labor constitutes violations of international humanitarian law. Based on these
earlier cases, the prosecution of private economic actors for similar criminal acts
should be actionable today. In other words, if an MNC actively sought forced
labor from a host government or acquiesced to the use of forced labor in a
factory or project, there is a good argument that the USMT and British Tribunal
decisions would create some sort of liability. As discussed below, the venue for
such a case might be either an international criminal tribunal or a domestic
court.

The USMT cases and the British Tribunal cases provide us with differing
assessments as to whether and when the defense of necessity should be applicable to economic actors (as contrasted with military personnel). The USMT accepted the defense of necessity proffered by several of the German defendants
that they had no choice but to accept forced labor, although only when the defendants could demonstrate that they feared loss of life as opposed to property.
By contrast, the British court appears to have rejected such a defense because it
found the various mining officials guilty despite their arguments about military
compulsion. Thus, under the British court's analysis, the fact that the use of
forced labor occurred during wartime should not, by itself, provide a defense for
corporate defendants.
Today, an MNC should not be absolved of liability simply because it
claims that the host government required it to take certain actions. The defense
of duress or necessity, moreover, is less relevant when assessing the decisions of
MNCs to collaborate with repressive governments. Today, an MNC makes a
109.
110.
11.

See Copper Mine Trial, SoUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 16, 1947, at 4.
See War Trial Ends, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 29, 1947, at 1.
See id.
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deliberate choice, outside of the context of war, to work with a repressive regime as a business partner.
The war crimes prosecutions also give rise to another open question:
Should knowledge alone also give rise to liability? Assume an MNC has knowledge that forced labor is used by a host government in a way that benefits the
MNC's investment activity, should this give rise to liability for the corporate
entity or the individuals? Should liability only be imposed when the MNC affirmatively requested or compelled the use of forced labor? As discussed below,
a federal district court recently concluded that knowingly accepting the benefits
of forced labor is insufficient to create liability.
The Nippon Mining, Farben, Krupp, and Rasche prosecutions provide us
with a spectrum upon which to assess culpability. On the one hand, active participation in the use of forced labor was deemed sufficient grounds for imposing
criminal liability. On the other hand, the mere act of providing money that financed the construction of a concentration camp was not sufficient. Today,
however, precedent established by the Yugoslav and Rwanda War Crimes
Tribunals support the notion that knowingly engaging in a war crime or crime
against humanity might well give rise to accomplice liability.
The gray area remains situations where an MNC might finance a project in
conjunction with a host government. In this situation, the actions of the MNC
arguably exceed the discrete activity of providing a commercial loan as was the
case with Rasche. There is an ongoing business relationship where, (1) continued economic benefit may be derived as a result of human rights violations, and
(2) repression is necessary to extract profits from the investment. In such a case,
the Rasche holding, discussed in Part II.A.3 above, could be distinguished because there the profits were made on the loan rather than on the ongoing operation of the factories at Auschwitz. The Rasche decision, moreover, is outdated
in the sense that international criminal law has evolved and the notion of accomplice liability has been developed more fully.
The issue of MNC culpability should be assessed in terms of the level,
degree and duration of complicity, and the context in which that complicity occurs. A single loan, for example, might not trigger liability whereas a continuous business relationship might. In some ways, the USMT tried to grapple with
the possible spectrum of culpability. It is significant to consider that the cases
adjudicated by the USMT were borne of war. Because they are not operating
against the backdrop of war, in which they may be commandeered by the State,
MNCs that work with repressive regimes today arguably present a stronger case
for the imposition of liability. Such MNCs are acting purely for profit rather
than out of the national interest. At the same time, any guidelines for when
liability should attach to an MNC must take into account the fact that MNCs
may operate in countries with internal civil conflicts.
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III.
CONTEMPORARY FORCED LABOR LITIGATION: REVISITING
WORLD WAR

A.

II

LitigationAgainst German MNCs

The war crimes trials have established an important precedent for holding
private civilians accountable for violations of international humanitarian law.

They also help to establish parameters for when to attribute liability to legal
persons and private actors with respect to egregious human rights violations
such as enslavement. In both the German and Japanese prosecutions, however,
the focus was on the criminal liability of individual defendants rather than the

corporations.
Only in recent years has the federal Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the
United States applied the doctrine from the USMT cases to MNCs directly. An
analysis of the recent forced labor cases is important for several reasons. First,
these cases help us to understand how courts have made the leap from the criminal prosecution of individual persons to the civil prosecution of MNCs. These
cases bridge the historical gap. Second, the recent litigation is directly related to
the use of forced labor by German enterprise during World War II. These cases
do not provide clear definitions or answers to the question of when an MNC
should be regarded as complicit. They do, however, help frame the pivotal
questions by focusing on the conduct of MNCs engaged in violations of international law through economic cooperation with a state.
The ATCA provides domestic remedies for plaintiffs for egregious violations of international law. 1 2 The ATCA was first enacted in 1789, during the
first session of the U.S. Congress. It authorized civil lawsuits in U.S. courts for
damages by persons injured by violations of international law. The ATCA pro112. For a useful overview of the history of the ATCA, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LIIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (Beth Stephens and Michael Ratner, eds., 1996). For a discussion of the

ATCA and MNC liability, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Litigating CorporateResponsibility, GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS 1, 7, (June 1, 2001), available at http://www.globaldimensions.net/articles/cr/steinhardt.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). Steinhardt notes that "there can be no prophylactic rule against
private obligations under international law, especially for well-defined, egregious violations of the
law. There is, in short, no doctrinal firebreak that keeps private corporations from being liable for
any violation of international law, ever." Later in the paper, Steinhardt also seems to imply that
jurisdiction via the ATCA is akin to an exercise of universal jurisdiction. When discussing possible
objections to the ATCA, he states, "the principle of universal jurisdiction expresses this sense that
some international wrongs are sufficiently intolerable that every state has a legally-protectable interest in its suppression to apply its own law. From this perspective, the domestic courts are not acting
unilaterally. They are acting as agents for the international legal order." Id. at 9. See also, Corporate Liabilityfor Violations of International Human Rights Law, 14 HARV. L. REv. 2025 (2001)
(advocating the development of a multilateral solution for MNC liability for human rights liability,
rather than creation of ill-defined standards under the ATCA); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporationsin the U.S. for Violating InternationalLaw, 4 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF.
81 (1999); Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held Liable
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations? 23 BROOK. J. I, r'L L. 927 (1998);
Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles:PromotingMultinational CorporateResponsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 881 (1999).
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(noncitizens of
vides federal court subject matter jurisdiction over suits by aliens
' 3
the U.S.) for a "tort . ..in violation of the law of nations." "
After lying dormant for nearly two centuries, the ATCA was revived in
1980 in a case brought by the family of a young man named Joel Filartiga, who
was tortured to death in Paraguay." 4 Although the trial court initially rejected
plaintiffs' claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reinstated the
case and noted that aliens could sue under the ATCA for violations of international law for which there was an international consensus. The court found that
there was such a consensus concerning the prohibition of torture." 5
The language of the ATCA states that courts may exercise jurisdiction over
torts in violation- of the "law of nations." U.S. courts have defined the law i of6
nations to include international law norms that are universal and obligatory."
This standard has been applied in an evolving manner by U.S. courts, to encompass a broad range of international human rights violations. One of the most
recent cases that has extended the scope of the ATCA was a lawsuit against
Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs during the war in the
and
Balkans. In Karadzic, the Second Circuit found that genocide, war crimes,
1 17
crimes against humanity were proper predicates for ATCA jurisdiction.
The Karadzic decision was also groundbreaking in that the court held that
certain international human rights norms were applicable to private actors as
well as public actors."t 8 Accordingly, the court concluded that the ATCA applies to suits against private parties (as opposed to state actors) where, as in
genocide, international law indicates that the prohibition binds private parties as
1
well as state actors. 19
113.
114.
115.

28 U.S.C. §1350 (2001).
See Filartigav. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Filartigacourt stated:
In the modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead
the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in
their individual and collective interest ...Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the
torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis hiumani
generis, an enemy of all mankind.
Id. at 890.
116. See Forti v. Suarez Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (on reconsideration).
117. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 244. Karadzic was the head of a de facto state based upon an
illegal seizure of power. He was charged by plaintiffs with genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, summary execution, and torture (including rape).
118. See id. at 239-43.
119. For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of December 9, 1948, specifically prohibits genocide whether committed by a public or private
actor. See Article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The USMT stated quite succinctly that private individuals have duties under international law:
It is argued that individuals holding no public offices and not representing the State,
do not, and should not, come within the class of persons criminally responsible for a
breach of international law. It is asserted that international law is a matter wholly
outside the work, interest and knowledge of private individuals. The distinction is
unsound. International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary municipal law. Acts judged criminal when done by an officer of the Government are criminal also when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not
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As discussed infra, U.S. courts extended the Karadzic decision one step
further in 1997, when a federal district court concluded that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the Unocal corporation with respect to its pipeline operations in
Burma. Unocal as a legal person was treated as analogous to a natural person
with respect to allegations of forced labor. For other violations of international
law such as the forcible displacement of Burmese civilians in order to build a
pipeline, the court relied on U.S. constitutional doctrine concerning "joint actors" where private entities have acted in concert with the government.
The basis, at least in American law, for imputing liability to MNCs under
the ATCA in the same fashion as natural persons is found in U.S. corporate and
tort law. For example, rules of criminal responsibility hold corporations accountable for the illegal acts of their agents, if the agent was acting within the
scope of his or her employment. In tort law, an agent's tortious acts can be
attributed to the employer if the agent is acting pursuant to his or her
employment. 120
The recent World War II slave labor cases will have a longstanding impact
on human rights litigation-firmly establishing, at least in American jurisprudence, the notion that a company can be sued civilly for certain direct participation in the use of forced labor. The question is no longer whether an MNC can
be sued but ratherwhat factual circumstances will give rise to liability.
In 1999, a host of cases was filed against German, Austrian, and American
corporations alleging that these companies, or related subsidiaries, had used and
benefited from slave labor during the Second World War. The suits were filed
using the ATCA as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In a parallel and
related effort, the German government and certain large German corporations
of $5.2 billion (approximately DM 10 million) to settle
agreed to create a fund
21
1
claims.
labor
slave
in quality . . . There is no justification for a limitation of responsibility to public
officials.
The Flick Case, supra note 50, at 1192.
120. See Stephens, supra note 12, at 219-20. ("The common acceptance in the United States of
the concept of corporate crimes, however, undoubtedly contributes to the acceptance of the related
concept that corporations can be held legally accountable for human rights violations.").
121. See John Hooper, Nazis forced labourersto get payments, THE GUtARDIAN, May 31, 2001,

available at http://www.guardian.co.ukinternationallstory/0,3604,498828,00.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2002). See also Interview with President William J. Clinton, 35 Wkly Compilation Presidential
Documents 2610, in Orlando, FL (Dec. 20, 1999), available at 1999 WL 12655361.
The website of the German Economy Initiative Foundation, the nonprofit created to disburse
the settlement funds, notes:
Today, it cannot be a matter to give payments alone for the fact of forced labor. No
legal basis exists for claims against German enterprises with regard to forced labor or
to injuries consequential upon persecution during the Nazi era. The consequences of
the fact that German enterprises were involved in Nazi wrongs cannot be settled by
legal means. However, German enterprises recognize their moral responsibility, in
particular where forced labor had to be performed under particularly harsh conditions
and in cases where enterprises cooperated in discriminating against people who were
persecuted on racial grounds during the Nazi regime.
See http://www.stiftungsinitiativede/eindexr.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
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According to recent documentation, over 400 German companies used
slave labor made available by the Nazis during the Second World War.' 2 2 Slave
laborers or forced laborers were not paid reparations by the German government. The German government took the position that private industry should
pay any restitution, since it had benefited from the slave labor. Conversely,
German corporations insisted that the government should be responsible for reparations since the postwar German government was a legal successor to the
Third Reich. German companies also claimed that responsibility should not rest
23
with them since they were forced to use slave labor by the German war effort.'
The necessity and duress defenses were commonly raised in the trials of the
industrialists, as well as in subsequent civil litigation in German courts.
The first slave labor action filed in the United States was against the American car manufacturer Ford Motor Company.1 24 In 1998, a federal class action
suit was filed in federal district court in Newark, New Jersey alleging that Ford
122. See Press Release, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Committee Issues Second List of German Firms That Used Slave and Forced Labor During the Nazi Era (Jan. 27, 2000),
available at http://www.ajc.orglpr/germany2ndlist.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). Plaintiffs' lawyers
commissioned a report that calculates the number of forced laborers under the Third Reich as well as
the number of survivors and the economic value of the labor brought to the present day. In the
summer of 1999, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld, and Toll asked Nathan Associates "to bring together in
a consistent framework the various estimates of the total number of foreign forced laborers during
World War I and of the number of survivors of this labor." See http://www.cmht.com/casewatch/
slavelabor/cwslreport.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
123. See, e.g., FERENCZ, supra note 30, at xviii. Ferencz, when referring to the industrialists
tried from I.G. Farben, Krupp, and Flick, states, "[als far as they were concerned, the use of slaves
was a patriotic duty which was both normal and proper under the circumstances." See also, id. at
188-89; Michael J. Bayzler, Nuremberg in America, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 194 n. 792. For an
interesting article on the role of historians in documenting the role of German industry in World War
II, see S. Jonathan Wiesen, German Industry and the Third Reich: Fifty Years of Forgetting and
Remembering,
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available at http:/I

www.adl.org/braun/dim-13-2-forgetting.htm] (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
124. See Ken Silverstein, Ford and the Fuhrer: New Documents Reveal Close Ties Between
Dearborn and the Nazis, Tim NATION, Jan. 24, 2000, available at http://past.thenation.com/issue/
000124/0124silverstein.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2001); David Ensor, G.M., Forddeny collaboration with Nazis during WWII, CNN.COM, Nov. 30, 1998, available at http://www.cnn.comUS/9811/
30/autos.holocaust (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). For a differing view, see Simon Reich, The Ford
Motor Company and the Third Reich, 13 DIMENSIONS: A JOURNAL OF HOLOCAUST STUDIES, availa-

ble at http://www.adl.org/braun/dimL13-2-ford.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). Reich, a professor
at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh is the
author of The Fruitsof Fascism: PostwarProsperityin HistoricalPerspective, which documents the
different degrees of success enjoyed by the Ford Motor Company in Germany and Great Britain in
the 1930's and 1940's. Reich was retained as part of an investigative team commissioned by Ford in
response to the forced labor lawsuit, to assess Ford's wartime activities. Reich states that, "I certainly found no evidence that American management ever sanctioned the use of slave labor or that it
even knew of the use of slave labor." See also, Adam Lebor, Slave Labour at Auschwitz Used by
Ford, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 20, 1999, at 8, available at 1999 WL 21262339.
On the subject of corporate payments to the victims of forced labor, the German Economy
Foundation Initiative states:
The absolutely necessary precondition for releasing the money is that all-embracing
and enduring legal peace be created for the companies, i.e. that they be protected
against all lawsuits and that there be a realistic prospect of protection against corresponding administrative and legislative measures against German companies.
German Economy Foundation Initiative, Preamble, available at http://www.stiftungsinitiative.de/
eindexr.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).

2002]

CORPORATE COMPLICITY

had knowingly accepted economic benefits derived from the use of forced labor
25
Ford Werke
by its German subsidiary, Ford Werke A.G. in Nazi Germany.'
also was joined as a defendant and the complaint alleged that the subsidiary had
profits from the aggressive use of forced labor
"knowingly earned enormous
'2 6
under inhuman conditions."'
The named plaintiff representing the class was Elsa Iwanowa, a Belgian
citizen and resident, who alleged that she performed unpaid "forced labor under
inhuman conditions for Ford Werke A.G." from 1942 to 1945 in its Cologne
plant. 127 Iwanowa claimed that she was "abducted by Nazi troops and transported to Germany with approximately 2,000 other children by a representative
128
The class was
of Ford Werke A.G." in order to work at the Cologne factory.
comprised of all persons who were compelled to work for Ford Werke between
1941 and 1945.129 Plaintiffs sought disgorgement of all profits and benefits that
out of
Ford earned through its subsidiary, as well as punitive damages "arising
' 130
defendant's knowing use of forced labor under inhuman conditions."
The complaint further alleged that Ford Werke AG, which had been doing
business in Germany since 1925 and was headquartered in Cologne, aggressively requested the use of forced laborers.' 3 ' The complaint states that in 1943,
25% of Ford Werke's workforce was unpaid forced labor. By 1944 the percentgrown to 50%. It apparently remained
age of unpaid laborers had allegedly
32
war.'
the
of
end
the
until
constant
Ford moved to dismiss the Iwanowa case on three grounds: (1) lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim; and (3) expiration of the
statute of limitations. 1 33 While the motion to dismiss was pending before the
court, new documents from Nazi archives were publicized revealing that Ford
Werke A.G. was one of 51 German companies to use Auschwitz internees as
that the American parent did not control
slave laborers. 13 4 Ford's response was
35
its German subsidiary's operations.1
Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the use of unpaid forced labor, Ford
Werke's annual profits had doubled by 1943.136 The complaint also stated that
unlike other subsidiaries of American-owned companies, Ford Werke had never
125. See Iwanowa v. FordMotor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999); see also, Class Action
Complaint and Jury Demand, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. (Civil Action No. 98-959).
126. Iwanowa complaint at 2.
127. Id. at R 1-2 and 24-28.
128. Id. at 25.
129. See id. at 29.
130. Id. at 38.
131. See id. at 1 10.
132. See id.
133. See Ford Motor Company's Motion to Dismiss, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. (Civil Action
No. 98-959).
134. See Lebor, supra note 123, at 8.
135. See Douglas Davis, Documents Reveal Ford was Part of the Auschwitz Industrial Complex, GLOBAL JEWISH NEWS, Aug. 22, 2001, available at http://www.jta.org/story.asp?story=2020
(last visited Nov. 3, 2001).
136. See Iwanowa Complaint 9 12.
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been nationalized by the Nazis and
that the American parent retained a control13 7
ling interest throughout the war.
In addition to the Ford case, dozens of other lawsuits were filed against
different German and Austrian corporations for their use of slave labor during
World War 11.138
In September 1999,139 Judge Joseph Greenaway, U.S. district court judge
for the District of New Jersey, dismissed the lawsuit against Ford and its subsidiary Ford Werke A.G. 14° However, before dismissing the claim, the court found
that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Iwanowa's slave labor claims under
the ATCA. 14 1 The court found that Ford indeed had used "unpaid, forced labor
during World War II" and that this "violated clearly established norms of customary international law."' 4 2 The court further stated that Iwanowa's allegation
that "she was literally purchased along with 38 other children... by a representative of [Ford Werke] ... [is sufficient] to support an allegation that [Ford and
Ford Werke ] participated in slave trading."' 43 Ford's
alleged slave trading also
44
was held to violate customary international law.
The court further noted that although customary international law is sometimes referred to as the "law of nations," it nonetheless applies to private actors
such as Ford in certain circumstances. 145 Slave trading, the court found "is included in that 'handful of crimes' to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility."' 46 The district court ruled that Ford could not use the nonstate actor argument because it had worked with the Nazi government to procure
slave laborers and therefore "acted as an agent of, or in concert with, the Ger137. See id. at 1 5.
138. See Joint Statement on occasion of the final plenary meeting concluding international talks
on the preparation of the Federal Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future," July
17, 2000, Annex C, List of known World War 1 and National Socialist era cases against German
companies pending in U.S. courts filed by plaintiffs' counsel participating in the negotiations. Lawsuits were filed against Agfa Gevaert, Alcatel, SEL, Albert Ackermann, Aktiengesellschaft, Audi,
BASF, Beiersdorf, BMW, Bosch, Continental, (Tire), Daimler-Benz, Diehl Sifting & Co., Dunlop,
drop Adler, Franz Haniel & Cie, Dyekerhoff Heinkel, Heiderlberger Zement, Hochtief, Hoescht,
Phillip Holzman, Hugo Boss, Leica Camera, Leonhard-Moll Krupp, Lufthansa, MAN, Mannesmann,
Messerschmitt-Boelkow-blohm, Miele & C., Pfaff Akteingesellschaft, Rheinmetall, Rodenstock,
Siemens, Steyr-Daimler-Puch, Thyssen, VARTA, Voiest, Volkswagen, Wurttembergische,
Metallwarenfabrik, and Zeppelin. American car manufacturers Ford and General Motors and their
German subsidiaries, Ford Werke A.G., and Opel, were also sued. For further discussion of the
slave labor litigation, see Bayzler, supra note 122, at 207, n. 843. See also Burger-Fischer v.
Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 281-82 (D.N.J. 1999).
139. Many of the slave labor cases were filed in federal court in New Jersey because the American subsidiaries of many German chemical and pharmaceutical companies are located in New
Jersey.
140. See lwanowa v. FordMotor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 491 (D.N.J. 1999).
141. See id. at 438-46.
142. Id. at 440.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 439-41.
145. Id. at 443-45.
146. Id. at 445 (citing Nat'l Coalition Gov't v. Unocal Corp., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
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man Reich." 1 4 7 Thus, the court treated Ford as if it was a natural person with
respect to certain violations of international law.
Although the court concluded that Ford had violated international law, it
ultimately dismissed Iwanowa's case. Dismissal was warranted, according to
the Court, because relevant treaties between the Allied Powers and Germany
required individual claims against corporations to be pursued exclusively
through inter-governmental settlement. t 48 Further, the court held that Iwanowa's claims against Ford and Ford Werke under the ATCA, American law,
147. Id. at 446 (referring to the Agreement on Reparations from Germany on the Establishment
of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on Restitution to Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, 3157
T.I.A.S. No. 1655).
148. See id at 460. The court first looked at the treaties entered into between the Allied powers
and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) subsequent to the War. In January 1946, the United
States and seventeen other nations met in Paris to sign the Paris Reparations Treaty obliging Germany to pay wartime reparations. See id. at 448-55. The Paris Reparations Treaty was never fully
executed as the Cold War led to the division of Germany into two states, the Federal Republic of
Germany (so called West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (so called East Germany).
See Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the
United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Settlement of Matters Arising
out of War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219 (as amended by
Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23,
1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219).
In 1952, the F.R.G. entered into a treaty known as the Transition Agreement with Western
Nations that postponed its payment of reparations. In 1953, the Wartime powers and seventeen
other nations entered into yet another treaty with the F.R.G. known as the London Debt Agreement.
See Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333, U.N.T.S. 3.
The London Debt Agreement deferred the collection of any reparations (as originally set forth
in the Paris Reparations Treaty) until the F.R.G. had rebuilt its economy. In 1990, the F.R.G. and
the German Democratic Republic both entered into a treaty with the United States, France, and the
U.S.S.R. known as the Two-Plus-Four Treaty. See Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to
Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1186. The lwanowa court treated the Two-Plus-Four Agreement as the treaty that settled the problem of wartime reparations because it stated that the Allied
nations could demand no further reparations from a unified Germany. See Iwanowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d
at 453. The court's analysis focused on article 5(2) of the London Debt Agreement:
Consideration of claims arising out of the Second World War by countries which
were at war with or were occupied by Germany during the war, and by nationals of
such countries, against the Reich, or agencies of the Reich ... shall be deferred until
the final settlement of the problem of reparations.
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (quoting from the London Debt Agreement).
Since plaintiff Iwanowa had been a national of the U.S.S.R. during World War II, Article 2
covered her claims. Furthermore, although Iwanowa's claims were against Ford and Ford Werke,
two private corporations, the court noted that previous interpretations of the London Debt Agreement provided the same deferral of reparations payments to private corporations. In 1963 and 1973,
the German Supreme Court held that private German corporations that utilized unpaid slave labor
were entitled to deferral of claims pursuant to the London Debt Agreement. See id. at 452-54 (discussing the German cases before the German Federal Supreme Court).
Commentators have critiqued the court's analysis of article 5(2) as being incorrect. For example, Bayzler remarks that,
nothing in the Agreement makes such claims available only through government-togovernment diplomacy. The court's analysis, in effect, interprets article 5(2) as not
only deferring such claims, but forever extinguishing them. Moreover, the court's
conclusion is contrary to the decisions reached by the German courts. Three German
court decisions in 1997, in 1998, and in 1999 have allowed private claims for slave
labor to go forward in German courts.
Bayzler, supra note 123, at 215.
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and German law, were all time barred. Finally, the court ruled that the lawsuit
49
should be dismissed on grounds of nonjusticiability and international comity. 1
In September 1999, on the same day in which the action against Ford was
dismissed, another federal district court (also in the federal district court for the
District of New Jersey) dismissed four other slave labor cases involving German
corporations Degussa and Siemens. 150 Degussa allegedly utilized slave laborers
in various refining and manufacturing facilities' 5 1 and Siemens purportedly used
nearly 100,000 slave laborers
in its electronic and communications equipment
152
manufacturing facilities.
Although Judge Dickensen Debevoise dismissed the lawsuits on grounds of
nonjusticiability, the court also made certain factual and legal findings that serve
as important precedents for future slave labor claims.' 53 First, the court noted
that the plaintiffs' claims comported with history concerning the involvement
and knowledge of Degussa and Siemens with respect to their use of slave labor:
"Plaintiffs factual allegations .. . are totally consistent with the history of the
Nazi era and with the record developed during the post-war trials in
54
Nuremberg." 1
In the Court's opinion in Burger-Fischerv. Degussa A.G., it stated that,
"[tihe plaintiffs' accounts of the wrongs they suffered at the hands of the Nazi
government and the defendants are deemed to be completely accurate. The historical events recited herein are established 55
either by undisputed submissions in
the record or are of common knowledge."'
The Burger-Fischerdecision, similar to the Iwanowa decision, affirms the
notion that the use of slave labor by private corporations is a violation of cus149. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 483-88 and 489-91. The discussion of justiciability suggests that the court dismissed the case under the political question doctrine.
150. See Burger-Fischer,65 F. Supp. 2d at 248. The opinion dismissed the following actions:
Vogel v. Degussa AG, Civil Action No. 98-5019 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 6, 1998); Klein v. Siemens AG,
Civil Action No. 98-4468 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 24, 1998); Licthman v. Siemens AG, Civil Action No.
98-4252 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 9, 1998); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, Civil Action No. 98-3958
(D.N.J. filed Aug. 21, 1998). All four cases involved Holocaust survivors who had worked as slave
laborers for German companies.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 253.
153. See id. at 272-81.
154. Id. at 255. The court went on to state:
In brief[,] Degussa and Siemens's executives were fully aware of the widespread use
of slave labor and of the inhumane conditions in which the victims lived and worked.
The two corporations were aware that this program was utilized not only to advance
the German war effort, but also as part of the Nazi goal of exterminating the entire
Jewish community in Germany, in the territories of its allies and in the conquered
lands. Degussa was aware of the uses to which the Zyklon B it manufacturer would
be used in concentration camps and was aware that the gold it refined was seized
from the Jewish people at their places of residence, when they arrived at the concentration camps and from their bodies before and after they had been killed. Knowing
this[,] Degussa and Siemens voluntarily participated and profited from the use of
slave labor and[,] in the case of Degussa, in the manufacture and sale of Zyklon B and
the refining of stolen gold.
Id. at 255.
155. Id. at 285.
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tomary international law: "There can be little doubt that the acts in which the
defendant corporations are alleged to have engaged were and are proscribed by
Gercustomary international law ...[and] defendants' alleged conduct violated
' 56
man civil law in effect at the time they engaged in that conduct."'
To date, Ford and Ford Werke have not participated in any settlement fund
or provided any reparations to laborers from the Werke plant. Degussa and Siemens, however, have pledged to participate in the German slave labor fund.' 5 7
The dismissal of the various slave labor cases allows a company such as Ford,
which regained ownership of the Werke plant at the end of World War II, to
avoid liability for its violations of international law.
The lawsuits are important for publicizing the complicity of German and
Austrian industry with the Nazis, as well as exerting pressure on German industry to participate in the slave labor fund. The cases also provide strong precedent for the fact that a corporation's active participation in the use of slave or
forced labor is actionable under the ATCA.
Most importantly, the cases bridge the gap between World War II and modem MNC complicity. The Iwanowa and Burger-Fischercourts recognized that
absent a treaty, plaintiffs would have a private right of action against the defendants for their violations of international law. In this respect, one can read the
USMT decisions in tandem with the modem forced labor cases and develop a
framework for holding MNCs accountable for direct complicity as outlined in
Section I.
B.

Litigation Against Japanese MNCs

While cases involving German corporations proceeded on the East Coast,
litigation relating to the use of Korean and Chinese civilian slave labor and
POW slave labor by the Japanese was commenced on the West Coast of the
United States.
In September 2001, Judge Vaughn Walker, federal district court judge for
the Northern District of California, dismissed a series of lawsuits brought by
Chinese and Korean nationals against Japanese corporations. The plaintiffs
sought compensation for forced labor activities during World War 11.158 The
court previously had dismissed cases brought by American and Allied war veter156. Id.
157. See David Voraceos, Ford Fights Lawsuit by Holocaust Survivors, THE RECORD, Aug. 6,
1999, at Al, availableat 1999 WL 7109695.
158. See In re World War 11 Japanese Forced Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (hereinafter Japanese Forced Labor Litigation I1). The case dismisses the following actions:
Choe v. Nippon Steel Corp., Kim v. Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., 0 v. Mitsui
Co., Ltd., Sin v. Mitsui C. Ltd., Su v. Mitsubishi Corp., Sung et. al v. Mitsubishi Corp., and Ma v.

Kajima Corp. For a brief account of the litigation, see David Caron and Adam Schneider, U.S.
Litigation Concerning Japanese ForcedLabor in World War 1I, ASIL INsIGrrs, Oct. 2000, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh57.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). For discussion of the
claims of POWs, see LINDA GoErz HOLMES, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: How JAPAN'S COMPANIES BUILT

POSTWAR FORTUNES UsING AMERICAN POWs (2001).
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ans who had been Japanese POWs on the grounds that their claims
were pre1 59
cluded by a peace treaty between the United States and Japan.
The primary cause of action of the civilian plaintiffs was based on a special
statute-Section 354.6--enacted by the California Legislature in 1999. The
statute provides a cause of action for all individuals forced to labor without
compensation "by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises
transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the
[same regimes]."' 60 The California statute also waived relevant statutes of limitations that might have otherwise barred claims. In addition to the state law
159. See In re World War 11 Era Japanese ForcedLabor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (dismissing the cases because the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan waived all claims) [hereinafter Japanese Forced Labor Litigation 111. Judge Walker, in his decision, focused on Article
14(b) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, between Japan and 47 other Allied powers. The Article
reads:
Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparation claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the
prosecution of the war, and claims of Allied Powers for direct military costs of
occupation.
114 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (quoting the Mulilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T.
3169, TIAS No. 2490.
The United States Congress is currently considering federal legislation that would either preserve their causes of action in federal court or would authorize some sort of payment to U.S. war
veterans who had been forced laborers for Japanese companies. See Steve La Rocque, Two Bills
Proposed to Help U.S. POWs Used as Forced Labor by Japan, United States Embassy (Tokyo),
available at http://www.usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhus0039.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
See also, Senate Urges Government to Negotiate for World War 11 Prisoners, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Nov. 1, 2000, available at http://www.207.25.71.29/2000/ALLPOLTICS/stories/l1/01/powlaw
suits.ap/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
In August 2001, Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Dianne Feinstein introduced legislation to assist
American POWs that were forced into slave labor by Japanese companies during World War II.
According to Senator Dianne Feinstein,
the POW Assistance Act of 2001 makes clear that any claims brought in state court,
and subsequently removed to federal court, will still have the benefit of the extended
statute of limitations enacted by the state legislatures. The statute of limitations
should not be permitted to cut off these claims before they can be heard on the merits.
Today's bill does nothing more than ensure that these POWs receive their fair day in
court.

Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Hatch/Feinstein Introduce POW Assistance Act of 2001 to
Assist American Soldiers Forced into Slave Labor by Japanese Companies During World War II
(Aug. 1, 2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/-feinsteinlreleasesOllR-POW.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2002).
160. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §354.6(a). Section 354.6(a) states:
Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave
labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a
Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim from
any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either
directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate.
Attorney General Bill Lockyer of California submitted an amicus brief supporting the constitutionality of the California statute. The Attorney General also submitted a similar amicus brief to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit supporting the constitutionality of California's
Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act, which required that insurance companies seeking to do
business in California provide information concerning insurance claims from the Holocaust Era.
The Ninth Circuit determined in March 2001 that the California insurance statute did not interfere
with U.S. foreign relations. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General
Lockyer Defends the Rights of Holocaust Victims and World War II Slave Laborers (Aug. 14,
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claims, the plaintiffs sought compensation under the ATCA and under various
state laws and customary international law. The court ultimately concluded that
§ 354.6 was unconstitutional because it infringes on the federal government's
exclusive power of foreign affairs. 16 1 As with the German slave labor cases, the
court found that the plaintiffs' claims were time barred.
Importantly, however, the court did find that a claim alleging that the Japanese corporations had used forced labor was actionable under the ATCA. The
court's reasoning was based largely on the findings of the New Jersey district
court in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.: "[i]n this regard, a district court in New
Jersey addressing forced labor claims under the ATCA against Ford Motor company recently concluded that '[t]he use of unpaid forced labor during World War
II violated clearly established norms of international law."' 62 The district court
also cited with approval the fact that the Iwanowa court had based its findings
on Nuremberg precedent.' 63
As with the German cases, the court was willing to state that "it seems
beyond doubt that two forced labor practices of defendants during the Second
World War violate traditional international law. ' 64 However, the court noted
that as such conduct took place over 15065years ago, the claims were precluded by
the controlling statute of limitations.
2001), available at http://www.caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2001/01-079.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2001).
161. See Japanese Forced Labor Litigation 11, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. The Japanese government had filed a submission with the court in which it stated that the California statute would have a
deleterious effect on its relationship with the United States, as well as with China, and North and
South Korea. See id. at 18-19. The U.S. State Department also concurred with this assessment. See
id. at 19.
162. Id. at 1179 (citing lwanowa v. FordMotor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999)).
163. The court stated:
As [the lwanowa court] reasoned, this conclusion is supported by the following: (1)
the Nuremberg Tribunals held that enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during the war constituted a crime against humanity in violation of international
law; (2) the Nuremberg Principle IV(b) provides that the "deportation to slave labor
...of civilian populations of or in occupied territory constitutes both a 'war crime'
and a 'crime against humanity"' (quoting Nuremberg Charter, Annexed to the
London Agreement on War Criminals, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 UNTS
279); and (3) several American and German jurists have stated that the conduct related to slave labor violates international law.
Id. at 1179.
164. Id. at 1179. For further discussion of Japanese corporations and their involvement with
wartime forced labor, see ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) Observation, 2000 Japan
(ratification 1932). In its annual report drawn up by a committee of legal experts, the ILO said
Japan's mass relocation of workers from the Korean Peninsula and Japanese-occupied areas of
China to work at mines, construction sites, and factories in Japan "violated ILO Convention No. 29
that banned forced labor." The unofficial version is available online at http://www.angelfire.com/
ny2/village/ilo2000.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
165. The court in Japanese Era Forced Labor Litigation II stated:
None of the allegations in the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs' complaints suggest that
they could not have attempted to bring those claims sooner. To be sure, the Ninth
Circuit only formally recognized a right of action under the ATCA in 1994. But the
statute has been in force since the 18th century and several courts found it to provide
a cause of action much earlier than the Ninth Circuit. The Korean and Chinese plain-
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In the end, the lawsuits brought against German and Japanese corporations
may achieve some small amount of relief for the victim plaintiffs through settlements brokered as a result of political negotiations (in the case of the German
lawsuits) or legislation (in the case of American POWs). Their greater significance, however, is in reinforcing the basis for holding a contemporary MNC
liable for suit under the ATCA by reference to Nuremberg and USMT proceedings as precedent. The U.S. courts, through their own deliberations, have extended the possibility of liability to corporations in addition to private
individuals. The trials of the industrialists did not make this link explicit.
The recent litigation brought by the forced labor victims of German and
Japanese enterprise makes it clear that legal persons have the same obligations
as natural persons when it comes to certain egregious violations of international
law norms, at least for purposes of ATCA jurisdiction. Even more important is
the fact that the courts have recognized that MNCs, even when collaborating
with a government actor, may nonetheless bear responsibility. MNCs, therefore,
may be directly complicit in crimes under international law. They are not excused solely because of the presence of the state.
It is ironic, however, that private violations of international law can be immunized by virtue of government settlements. If such collaboration can result in
immunity, it should result in liability in situations where there is no settlement
(i.e., in the non wartime context of MNC activity today). There is currently a
debate within the human rights community as to whether a government can or
should ever grant amnesty for gross human rights violations without itself
breaching its own duties under treaties and customary international law. To do
so, some commentators argue, would be incompatible with the duty of states to
investigate such acts and to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction. States cannot, it is argued, deprive individuals of their right to an effective remedy.
IV.
BENEFICIARY COMPLICITY'

66

: THE UNOCAL

CASE AND FORCED

LABOR IN BURMA

The criminal prosecution of industrialists after World War II and the more
recent forced labor cases are highly relevant to the development of a doctrine of
corporate complicity for MNCs that collaborate with repressive governments
today. The existence of recent civil litigation against a multinational oil company alleging that it knowingly permitted the use of forced labor is illustrative of
tiffs do not assert reasons why their claims could not have been brought under the
ATCA within ten years of the war's end.
164 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
166. The term beneficiary corporate complicity is a relatively new term. It has been used to
refer to situations in which an MNC knowingly benefits from human rights violations committed by
someone else (e.g., a host government). For a discussion of this concept, see Clapham and Jerbi,
supra note 40.
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the continuing probity of the167criminal prosecutions of World War II era German
and Japanese industrialists.
Modem MNC complicity, however, may occur outside of the context of
war. It is important, therefore, to appraise contemporary situations to determine
when an MNC might be liable outside of war. As noted above, the larger question is whether an MNC could be liable as a result of its role as a beneficiary
accomplice (also referred to as indirect complicity). As discussed in Part I, beneficiary complicity relates to situations in which an MNC has knowledge of
ongoing human rights violations in a host country and engages in a business
167. For example, the Hererro community in Namibia has instituted a legal claim against German companies seeking reparations for the enslavement and destruction of their tribe. The lawsuit
alleges that imperial Germany (which colonized Namibia in the early twentieth century) had formed
a "brutal alliance" with German industry and engaged in enslavement, extermination, forced labor,
medical experimentation, and other crimes in order to advance common financial interests. See
Hererros Sue German Firm for Reparations, BUSINESS DAY, Sept. 6, 2001, available at http://allafrica.com/storiesl200109060457/html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). For a description of German colonization in Southwest Africa, see A Bloody History: Namibia's Colonization,BBC NEWS, Aug. 29,
2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsidl514000/1514 856.stm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2001).
The United Steel Workers Union and the International Labor Rights Fund have partnered with a
Colombian trade union to file suit against Coca-Cola, its Latin American bottler, and two Florida
investors who own a bottling company in Colombia. The lawsuit alleges that Coca-Cola's Colombian business partners maintain open relations with a Colombian death squad as part of a strategy to
intimidate trade union leaders. The complaint states that five union members working in Coca-Cola
bottling plants have been killed since 1994. See Coke Abuse in Columbia, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (2001), available at http://www.essential.org/monitor/mm200 1/0l septembersepO l front.html
(last visited Jan. 24, 2002). See also Aram Rostoin, It's The Real Thing: Murder, THE NATION, Sept.
3, 2001, available at http://www.thenation.comdocmhtmll=20010903&c=l &s=roston (last visited
Oct. 9, 2001); Julian Borger, Coca-Cola sued over bottling plant terror campaign, THE GUARDIAN,
July 21, 2001, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,525209,00.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2001). For a copy of the complaint, see http://www.laborrights.org/projects/
coke/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
The United Steelworkers and UNITE have also brought a case in federal district court in California against textile and garment manufacturers in which Nicaraguan garment workers allege that
their employers have subjected them to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in violation of the
rights to life, liberty, and security of person and have prevented them from exercising their right to
freedom of association in contravention of international law. Plaintiffs are bringing their suit under
the ATCA. See Plaintiffs' Complaint in Manzanerez v. C&Y Sportswear,available at http://www.
nlcnet.org/court-complaint.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
In June 2001, Exxon was sued by eleven villagers from Aceh, a territory in Indonesia. Plaintiffs allege that Exxon paid Indonesian security forces to guard its facilities and that the company
had provided the military with buildings that were used to torture local residents who are part of the
Free Aceh movement and excavators to dig mass graves for victims of military violence. The lawsuit further alleges that the company purchased military equipment for security forces assigned to the
project and also paid mercenaries to provide training and intelligence to military in the project area.
Exxon closed down its operations in March 2001 due to security concerns. See Audrey Gillan,
Exxon Accused of Rights Abuses, THE GUARDIAN, June 22, 2001, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,510896,00.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001); Aceh: Lawsuit accuses Exxon Mobil of complicity in abuses, DOWN TO EARTH, Aug. 2001, available at http://
www.gn.apc.org/dte/5OAch.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2001). For a copy of plaintiffs' complaint, see
http:/lwww.laborrights.orglprojects/acehlindex.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
Weir Group, a Scottish manufacturer of oil pumps used for oil pipelines has been criticized by
human rights groups for its business activity in the war-torn Sudan. Weir allegedly has been complicit in the Khartoum government's campaign of violence against the population. See Saeed Shah,
Weir Group Stands Firm Over Sudan, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 23, 2001, available at http://
www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=90140 (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
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relationship with a repressive host government. If the MNC, after learning of
human rights violations linked to its investment, continues to do business with
the host government, this should give rise to accomplice liability. An important
caveat is that the MNC needs to benefit from the violations.
In the United States, one of the earliest cases in which a court held that a
multinational corporation could be subject to a civil suit for alleged violations of
international human rights law was Doe v. Unocal.1 6 8 Unocal, a multinational
oil company, undertook a joint venture with Total S.A, a French oil company,
and the Myanmar government, to extract oil and build a pipeline in the Tennaserim region of Burma (Myanmar).1 69 The case was filed in federal district
court in California on behalf of Burmese citizens who allegedly suffered torture,
assault, rape, loss of their homes and property, forced labor, and other human
rights violations. 17 0 In addition to the corporation, the plaintiffs named the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Unocal as defendants.
The Unocal case is significant because it was the first lawsuit in which a
court acknowledged that an MNC could be liable for violations of international
law. It is also important because of two conflicting district court decisions that
have emerged. In 1997, a federal district court refused to dismiss the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that knowing acceptance of the benefits of forced labor was actionable as a violation of international
law. By contrast, in August 2000, a different judge ruled that Unocal could not
be held liable solely for knowing about the Burmese government's use of forced
labor in relation to the pipeline project.
168. Other cases include Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). The
Wiwa case charged that the defendants, Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading
Company, were complicit in human rights violations perpetrated by Nigerian security forces, including the murder of prominent environmental activists. Jota v. Texaco, Inc. involves two consolidated
claims, Aguinda v. Texaco (S.D.N.Y., Docket No. 93-7527) (on behalf of residents of the Oriente
Region of Ecuador), and Aguinda v. Texaco (D.D., Docket No. 94 Civ. 9266) (residents of Peru).
The complaints allege that Texaco polluted the rain forests and rivers of the two countries during oil
exploration in Ecuador between 1964 and 1992. The case was originally dismissed on the ground of
forum non-conveniens. In 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
dismissal. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether it should be heard in Ecuador. A more recent case is Bowato v. Chevron (N.D. Cal. 1999, Docket No. C99-2506). This case
charges that Califomia-based Chevron was involved in a series of machine gun attacks upon unarmed protestors in Nigeria. The protestors were allegedly summarily executed during the attacks,
burned in a fire set during the attack, or subsequently tortured by the police after the attack. For an
analysis of the current status of these and other cases, see Jennifer Green and Paul Hoffman, Litigation Update: A Recent Summary of Developments in the U.S. Cases Brought Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, in THE AMERsCAN Csvu. LmEaRrts UNION INTERNATIONAL Civi LIBERTIEs REPORT (2001), availableat http://www.aclu.org/library/iclr/2001/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
169. For Unocal's description of its investment activity in Burma, see http://www.unocal.coml
myanmar (last visited Oct. 1, 2001). For additional background that supported the plaintiffs' viewpoints, see EARTHRiGHTs INTERNATIONAL AND SoUmTAsT AsIAN INFORMATION NErwo,

DENIAL: A REPORT ON THE YADANA

PIPELINE PROJECr IN BURMA

TOTAL

(1996) available at http://

www.earthrights.org/pubs/td.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001). For an update on the Yadana Pipeline
Project, see EARTHRomHs INTERNATIONAL, TOTAL DENIAL CoNrNt s (2000), available at http://
(last visited Jan. 24, 2002); see also http://
www.earthrights.org/pubs/td2000.html
www.earthrights.orgburma.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
170. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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Burma has been under military control since 1958.171 In 1988, Burma's
military government suppressed pro-democracy movements and imposed martial law. A new military government, known as the State Law and Order Resto1 72
ration Council (SLORC), took control and renamed the country Myanmar.
The 1997 decision by Judge Paez of the Central District of California, ruled
that Unocal could be held liable for human rights violations under public international law if the plaintiffs could prove that Unocal acted in concert with the
Burmese military government in carrying out these abuses. The court further
held that Unocal could be held independently liable for using forced labor.
The Unocal decision extended the scope of the ATCA173 to private corporations. The Court noted that for certain violations of international law, private
actors (such as Unocal) might be liable absent state action. Citing the Karadzic
decision, the court observed that "[plarticipation in the slave trade "violates the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state
or only as private individuals." ' 74 For other types of violations of international
law, the court held that if Unocal was a "joint actor" with SLORC (i.e., the
Burmese government), "where there is a substantial degree of cooperative action
private actors in effecting the deprivation of rights, state
between the state and
' 175
action is present."
With respect to the plaintiffs' factual allegations, the court found that the
allegations were sufficient to support a claim under the ATCA:
The allegations of forced labor in this case are sufficient to constitute an allegation of participation in slave trading. Although there is no allegation that SLORC
is physically selling Burmese citizens to the private defendants, plaintiffs allege
that, despite their knowledge of SLORC's practice of forced labor, both in general
and with respect to the pipeline project, the private defendants have paid and
continue to pay SLORC to provide labor and securityfor the pipeline, essentially
treating SLORC as an overseer accepting the benefit of and approving the use of

forced labor. These allegations are sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA. 17-6
When moving to dismiss the lawsuits, defendants asserted that Unocal had
nothing more than a business relationship with SLORC and MOGE. The court
rejected this argument and stated: "First, plaintiffs allege that Unocal and its
officials knew or should have known about SLORC's practices of forced labor
and relocation when they agreed to invest in the Yadana pipeline project, and
that despite this knowledge, they agreed that SLORC would provide labor for
the joint venture. ... ""'
171. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
172. See id. More recently, SLORC has changed its name to the State Peace and Development
Council.
173. See 28 U.S.C. §1350.
174. Doe 1, 963 F. Supp. at 893 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 238).
175. Id. at 891. The court relied on precedent dealing with joint action between the state and
private actors under U.S. positional law. This article does not explore the parameters of the joint
action test because the prohibition against engaging in slave labor is one that the Unocal court found
extended to private individuals even in the absence of state action.
176. Id. at 892 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 896 (citing Unocal Complaint at 52).
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The initial court decision focused on several key criteria for establishing
the potential liability of Unocal with respect to the forced labor claims. The
court rejected the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on
the basis of three of the plaintiffs' allegations: (1) that Unocal financed
SLORC's operations; (2) that Unocal knew about the use of forced labor; and
(3) that Unocal accepted the benefits of forced labor. Thus, the plaintiffs maintained that Unocal went beyond the mere act of providing finance to a war
criminal (e.g., as in the case of Karl Rasche).
After the defendants lost on their motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, they proceeded against the plaintiffs with motions for summary judgment.
On August 31, 2000, a different judge granted the defendants' motions on the
ground that although there was evidence that Unocal knew about and benefited
from forced labor on the Burma pipeline project, it was not involved directly in
the alleged abuses. The court cited to decisions of the USMT involving the
prosecution of German industrialists for their participation in the use of slave
labor by the Third Reich. The summary judgment decision appears to be a complete reversal of the court's earlier findings regarding the legal standards governing the forced labor claim.
In its decision granting summary judgment, the court first described the
history of Unocal's presence in Burma and its knowledge of the forced labor
problem. Unocal began negotiating with SLORC in 1991.178 In May 1992,

Unocal retained a consulting company, Control Risk Group, to assess the risks
associated with foreign investment in Burma. The report makes note of the fact
that: "Throughout Burma the government habitually makes use of forced labor
'
In 1992, the Myanmar government established a stateto construct roads." 179
owned company, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), as the holding
company for the government's interest in energy resources.
Unocal bid on an oil product license but initially lost to the French Oil
Company Total. Thereafter, MOGE entered into contractual agreements with
Total. 1 80 In furtherance of the oil project, MOGE contracted to "assist and expedite [Total's] execution of the Work Programme by providing .. .security

protection and rights of way and easements as may be requested by [Total]. ' t s
Unocal eventually acquired 1a8 47.5 percent interest in Total's rights and interests
in the various oil contracts.
One part of the project involved the construction of a pipeline in Burma's
Tennasarim region. As the court noted: "According to the deposition testimony
of plaintiffs and witnesses, the military forced plaintiffs and others, under threat
of violence, to work on these projects [building army barracks and helipads and
clearing roads] and to serve as porters to the military for days at a time."' 83 The
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Doe 1, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297 (citing Richardson Declaration, Ex. 476 at 33575).
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1298.
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court also stated that the violence perpetrated against the plaintiffs "is well
documented." 184
In early 1995, human rights groups began corresponding and meeting with
Unocal executives to inform them of the increased use of forced labor and of
villager relocation by the Myanmar government.' 85 Unocal took the position
that SLORC was providing military protection for the pipeline as part of its
contractual obligations. 186 Some correspondence between Unocal employees
internally or with Total indicates that there was some deliberation over the naprovided by SLORC and also Unocal's relationship to SLORC
ture of services
1 87
in this regard.
The court, in its reasoning, notes that slavery is a violation of jus cogens
norms which were derived from values taken to be fundamental by the international community and which "enjoy the highest status within customary international law and are binding on all nations."' 88 Thus, the court noted that
individual liability under the ATCA could be established for acts amounting to
slavery or slave trading.' 89 The plaintiffs contended that forced labor is akin to
"modern slavery," whereas Unocal characterized the Myanmar military's use of
forced labor as a public service requirement. t 9°
The court cited reports and conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) when discussing the issue of whether forced labor constitutes slavery. As the court noted, Burma is a signatory to twenty-one ILO conventions
including Forced Labor Convention No. 29, which prohibits the use of forced
labor and defines it as "all work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily." 19 1 The ILO has repeatedly condemned Burma and issued
a report in 1998 concerning Burma's non-compliance with the forced labor conthat the definition of slavery now encomvention. The report 1acknowledged
92
passes forced labor.
184.

Id.

See id. at 1299.
See id. at 1300-01.
The court noted that on May 10, 1995:
A Unocal employee, Joel Robinson, sent a letter informing Total of his general
thoughts about his visit to the pipeline route ... The letter stated that from Unocal's
standpoint, probably the most sensitive issue is what is forced labor and how can you
identify it. I am sure that you will be thinking about the demarcation between work
done by the Project and work done on behalf of the Project. Where the responsibility
of the Project ends is very important. ld. at 1301 (emphasis in the original, citations
omitted).
See also letter from Total's Herve Chagnou to Unocal, dated Feb. 1, 1996, in which Chagnou states:
"About forced labour used by the troops assigned to provide security on our pipeline project, let us
admit between Unocal and Total that we might be in a gray zone." Id. at 1302.
188. Id. at 1304 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 96 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992).
189. See id. at 1307.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1308 (citing Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 29 (1930)).
185.
186.
187.

192. See id. (citing Forced Labor in Myanmar (Burma): Report of the Commission of Inquiry
Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the InternationalLabour Organizationto Examine
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The court rejected Unocal's public service argument and also noted that
"the evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that forced labor was being utilized and that the Joint Venturers benefited from the practice."', 93 Despite Unocal's knowledge, the court still dismissed the lawsuits. The court based its
decision on a review of three decisions cited by plaintiffs "concerning the prosecution of German industrialists for their participation in the Third Reich's slave
policies." According to the court, plaintiffs claimed that based on these cases,
and approval of slave labor activity is sufficient for a finding of
knowledge
1 94
liability.
Borrowing directly from the USMT proceedings, the court stated that during the Second World War, the Reich Labour office "implemented a massive
slave-labor program utilizing foreign civilians, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates. The German government compelled German factories to
employ the slave laborers and severely punished industrialists for failing to meet
production quotas." 1 95 The court appeared to cast the Nazi slave labor program
as one that was imposed by the Nazi regime on private industry. Hence, the
opinion suggests that many German industrialists accepted slave labor in their
factories as a matter of necessity rather than as a deliberate criminal act. In
other words, the Unocal court focused on the acceptance of forced labor as a
result of necessity.
In Unocal, the court focused primarily on necessity as a defense to war
crimes prosecutions. The Unocal court first analyzed the USMT prosecution of
the Flick enterprise. The court emphasized that the USMT found that four of the
six Flick defendants were entitled to the affirmative defense of necessity with
respect to using slave labor.' 9 6 The court pointed out that "in reaching its decision, the Tribunal acknowledged that the German slave labor program was created and supervised by the Nazi government, and that it would have been futile
and dangerous for these defendants to have objected."' 197 The Unocal court contrasted Flick's conviction on the grounds that he "took active steps to participate
in the Reich's slave labor program .'"98
the Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ILO Part IV.9.A § 198
(1998).
193. Id. at 1310.
194. See id. at 1309.
195. Id. See generally, YISREAL GuTmAN ArND MicHAEL BERENBAUM, ANATOMY OF AN AuscHwrrz DEATH CAMP (Indiana Univ. Press 1994) (discussing conditions of slave laborers forced to
work for German industry).
196. See Doe 1, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
197. Id. At Nuremberg, Flick's defense counsel argued that defendants had acted out of necessity with respect to their use of slave labor. According to an American prosecutor, defense counsel
"pictured the deeds of the German industrialists as acts of military and economic necessity against
the 'Red Flood.' The employment of forced labor was explained away as something beyond the
defendant's control in a situation where production was ordered by the state and supervised by the
SS." The prosecution, led by General Telford Taylor, rebutted the defense thesis by stating that the
wholesale deportation of millions of civilians was not lawful under international law. Defense counsel also noted that the Hague Conventions were an anachronism that even the Allies had repudiated.
See The Flick Case, supra note 50, at 1044-90, 1157, and 1172-85.
198. Doe 1, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
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The case of I.G. Farben was the second USMT prosecution consulted by
the Unocal court. The court noted that "like the Flick defendants, the Farben
defendants invoked the necessity defense and testified that they were under such
oppressive coercion and compulsion that they could not be said to have acted
with criminal intent." 19 9 Moreover, the court stated that five of the Farben defendants were found guilty, despite their proffered necessity defense, because
"like Weiss and Flick, they were not moved by a lack of moral choice, but on
the contrary, embraced the opportunity to take full advantage of the slave labor
program. Indeed, it might have been said that they were, to a very substantial
degree, responsible for broadening the scope of that reprehensible system.''2 °°
According to the Unocal court, the USMT noted that the Third Reich had
not compelled Krupp to accept slave labor "but instead coincide[d] with the will
of these from whom the alleged compulsion emanate[d]. 20 1 Furthermore, the
"Krupp firm had manifested not only its willingness but its ardent desire to employ forced labor." 20 2 The court's emphasis seems to focus more on the will of
the German industrialists and whether they had acted out of free will or had
been compelled to act. Although the court's analysis of the USMT precedent
focuses on issues of will, its analysis of Unocal focuses more on direct versus
indirect participation in the forced labor.
Based on a review of these decisions, the court held that in order to be
liable, Unocal must have taken active steps in cooperating or participating in the
forced labor activities. Mere knowledge that someone else might commit abuses
was not sufficient.Unable to adduce the requisite affirmative conduct, the Unocal court ruled that the corporation could not be held liable under international
law and therefore the claim under the ATCA failed.20 3
The court assessed Unocal's actions in relation to the Myanmar government in connection with plaintiffs' physical violence and forced relocation
claims. These alleged human rights violations are ones that require state action
(in order to be actionable). The court analyzed whether Unocal could be
deemed to have "acted under color of law" by acting together with state officials
or with significant state aid.2° 4
In making this determination, the court analyzed whether Unocal was a
"joint actor" with the Myanmar government with respect to the alleged human
rights violations. Joint action has been found whether a private party is a "willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents." Some of the indicia of
joint action, according to the court, include "a conspiracy between private and
state actors" and "willful participat[ion] in joint action with the State or its
199. Id. at 1310 (citing to Krauch, supra note 53).
200. Id. (citing Krauch, supra note 53). The court also noted that Krauch was characterized as
"a willing participant in the crime of enslavement."
201. Id. (citing Krupp, supra note 52, at 1439).
202. Id. (citing Krupp, supra note 52, at 1440).
203. Id. at 1310. See also William Branigin, Claim against Unocal rejected: Judge cites evidence abuses in Burma but no jurisdiction,WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2000, at E10.
204. Doe 1, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
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agents."' 20 5 The cooperation, furthermore, needs to be of a "substantial
degree." 2 °6
In particular, the court focuses on a decision from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Gallagherv. Neil Young Freedom Concert.207
In this case, the appeals court described joint action as follows:
Some courts have adopted the requirements for establishing a conspiracy under
Section 1983. These courts [require] that both public and private actors share a
common, unconstitutional goal. Under this conspiracy approach, state action may
be found 2if0 a8 state actor has participated in or influenced the challenged decision
or action.

In Gallagher,the University of Utah (a state university and state actor), had
met with and retained private security for a rock concert. The security firm had
engaged in a pat down search of concert-goers before allowing them to enter the
concert venue. Plaintiff concert-goers
sued the university and the firm for viola2 9
tions of their constitutional rights. 0
The Unocal court noted that in Gallagher, a university and the state had
shared a common goal of producing a profitable music concern but had not
shared a common goal of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Gallagher court concluded that the university's silence as to the kind of security
provided or its acquiescence to the searches did not create state action.210
The Unocal plaintiffs alleged that Unocal's participation in a joint venture
satisfied the requirements for state action under the joint action test. The court
rejected this argument and concluded:
as in Gallagher, Unocal and SLORC shared the goal of a profitable project.
However, as the Gallagher court states, this shared goal does not establish joint
action. Plaintiffs present no evidence that Unocal 'participated in or influenced'
the military's unlawful conduct; nor do Plaintiffs present evidence
that Unocal
'conspired' with the military to commit the challenged conduct. 2 '1
The court, in assessing whether Unocal's actions were the proximate cause
of the human rights violations, concluded that "plaintiffs present no evidence
Unocal 'controlled'
the Myanmar military's decision to commit the alleged tor2 12
tuous acts."
As discussed below, there are alternative ways in which a court can and
should analyze conduct in the context of an international joint venture to determine whether Unocal aided and abetted SLORC's human rights violations with
respect to torture and forced relocation. The court based much of its analysis on
one or two alternative tests developed under American law, rather than looking
to international law for precedent. Furthermore, the Gallagher case involved a
205.
206.
207.
208.
107 (9th
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)).
Id. at 1306.
See 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1454 (quoting Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. ForMental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106,
Cir. 1991)).
See id. at 1146.
See id at 1456-57.
Doe 1, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
Id. at 1307.
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one-time relationship between the state and a private actor. Unocal was part of a
long-term venture with SLORC that necessarily involved more collaboration between the parties and hence a different type of approach to the question of
whether Unocal was acting under color of law.
V.
RETHINKING CORPORATE COMPLICITY AFTER THE
SECOND WORLD WAR

Under certain circumstances, war may create an emergency" situation that
allows for derogation from certain principles of international law. This is evidenced by the USMT's findings in the trials of the industrialists. In the absence
of war, should an MNC be allowed to continue to receive the economic benefit
of illegal forced labor? Is there a point at which conscious acceptance of a
benefit over an extended period of time constitutes active participation in the
forced labor (i.e., does beneficiary complicity ever give rise to liability?)?
A.

Unocal Summary Judgment Focuses Incorrectly on the Issue of Necessity

The Unocal summary judgment decision does not consider the temporal
nature of Unocal's actions in Burma, which are potentially of indefinite duration. When the World War II industrialists were tried, the war had ended and
the enslavement had ceased. The Unocal case is being litigated against a backdrop of ongoing human rights violations.
The largest problem, however, is the fact that the court makes no effort to
distinguish between wartime and non-wartime violations of jus cogens norms.
One major distinction between the trials of the German industrialists and the
trial of Unocal relates to context. The German industrialists used forced labor
during wartime; Unocal is alleged to have used or at least benefited from forced
labor outside of the context of war.
There is a civil war in Burma but this war does not directly implicate
Burma-other than to make MNCs' investment activity riskier. But this type of
political risk is inherent in foreign investment decisions and cannot be equated
with a wartime situation where a government may compel a company within its
jurisdiction to engage in the use of slave labor. Security for a project may be
necessary when internal conflict exists in a host country. Securing a site, however, does not mean that government security forces may engage in forcible
conscription of citizens or other egregious violations of human rights.
Based on the categories of complicity outlined in Part I, litigation against
Unocal should proceed. The Myanmar military was an agent of the Total-Unocal-SLORC joint venture and its activities were carried out in furtherance of the
joint venture. The court, rather than focusing on whether Unocal had aided and
abetted SLORC, analyzed whether Unocal had actively participated in enslavement or in some way had been compelled to do so under duress. In light of the
historical differences, as well as the earlier Unocal ruling in 1997, it is puzzling
why the district court focused much of its decision on language from the USMT
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decisions discussing the fact that the defendants knew of and accepted the benefits of slave labor out of necessity.
In Flick, the USMT defined necessity as follows: "Necessity is a defense
when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid an evil both serious and
irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil."21 3 The defense of necessity, therefore, rests on the premise that there is no means of escaping the egregious wrong
that one is forced to commit.
If one accepts the Unocal court's version of the Flick and Farben cases, the
reason why more than acceptance of the forced labor was actionable is because
there were grounds for defendants to plead an affirmative defense of necessity.
The defendants in the Nuremberg cases would have been found liable for aiding
and abetting the forced labor program if they did not have access to the necessity
defense. 2 14 The Krupp defendants, in fact, were convicted of forced labor and
their defense was summarily rejected. In Flick, the necessity defense was defeated by a showing that the defendant actively expanded its production efforts
and increased the use of slave labor. The increase was not "necessary" for the
Flick defendants to avoid retribution from the Nazis.
In the Unocal case, however, Unocal had and has a choice either to stop
participating in forced labor programs by terminating its business relationship
with the Myanmar government or to continue receiving the benefits of illegal
slave labor. Unocal does not fear any retribution from Myanmar such as fear of
death, as claimed by the German industrialists. The German defendants were
exonerated when they could invoke the defense of necessity, not because knowledge was insufficient to trigger liability.
Moreover, decisions from the International War Crimes Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have found that defendants who aid or abet
human rights violations do not have the defense of duress or necessity available
to them. 21 5 Necessity has been treated as relevant only as a mitigating factor at
the sentencing phase. 21 6' The defense of duress is not condoned under contem213. The Flick Case, supra note 50, at 1200.
214. See id. (quoting Article 1I of Control Council Law No. 10, stating that "any person.., is
deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the
commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or
(d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission; see also, The Krupp Case,
supra note 52, at 1433-34.
215.

See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 14 PRINCIPLES ON ThE EFFEc-

TriVE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Principle 5 (1999), available at http://www.web.am-

nesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/14-principles (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). Principle 5 states that the
related defense of acting under the orders of a superior is prohibited as a defense with respect to
grave crimes against international law. Amnesty International notes that Article 33 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), provides that a superior
order does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity or genocide.
The statutes for the International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda also exclude superior orders as a defense.
216. See Prosecutorv. Drazen Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, Trial Judgment, Nov. 29, 1996,
available at http://www.un.orglicty/erdemovic/trialc/judgementlerd-tsj961129e.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2002).

20021

CORPORATE COMPLICITY

porary humanitarian law for violations ofjus cogens norms; therefore the court's
emphasis is incorrect. Gross violations of human rights do not constitute "lawful" acts of state. Consequently, the defense of necessity or sovereign compulsion should not be available when the MNC assists a host government in
violating jus cogens norms.
In addition to some of the excerpts that the court emphasized in its decision, there are some alternative pieces of text that suggest that the USMT's
acquittal of some of the defendants on the grounds of necessity was not supported by all the American judges. For example, in the trial of the Farbendefendants Judge Paul Herbert believed that his colleagues had been too lenient
with the defendants:
I conclude from the record that Farben accepted and frequently sought the forced
workers ... The important fact is that Farben's Versant [executive board of directors] willingly cooperated in utilizing forced labor. They were not forced to do so
...The conditions at Auschwitz were so horrible that it is utterly incredible to
conclude that they were unknown to defendants, the principle corporate directors,
... Each defendant
who were responsible for Farben's connection with the project
7
who is a member of the Vorstand should be held guilty. Z
The Unocal case is currently on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. It is notable, however, that the principle that a private
non-state actor can be sued before the U.S. courts for alleged violations of
human rights was not challenged. The outcome of the Unocal case is crucial.
The issue of whether beneficiary complicity is sufficient to create liability for an
MNC is at stake.
B.

Can Unocal Be Characterizedas an Accomplice with Respect to the
Forced Labor Claim?

The question of what constitutes "complicity" also remains unclear within
the Unocal decisions. The original district court opinion held that Unocal
merely accepted the benefits of the criminal acts, but did not directly participate
in them as an accomplice. There is a plausible argument, however, that Unocal's
alleged actions in financing SLORC, when coupled with the knowledge of
SLORC's criminal purpose, triggers Unocal's liability for aiding and abetting
SLORC in its enslavement of villagers.
To date, human rights literature has not provided clear parameters for what
constitutes direct versus indirect corporate complicity in human rights abuses.
Thus, the Unocal court was working with limited precedent when trying to create its own standards for corporate complicity.
Accomplice liability requires intentional participation, but not necessarily
any intention to do harm. Rather, knowledge of foreseeable harmful effects
should be sufficient. International criminal law has evolved since Nuremberg to
explicitly include liability for aiding and abetting the commission of a crime.
Thus, direct participation in the crime is not required in order to be found liable
as an accomplice. As two commentators have noted:
217.

FERENCZ, supra note 30, at 35.
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[A] corporation which knowingly assists a State in violating the customary international law principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
could be viewed as directly complicit in such a violation. For example, a company that promoted, or assisted with, the forced relocation of people in circumhuman rights could be
stances that would constitute a violation of international
2 18
considered directly complicit in the violation.

Aiding and abetting constitutes a prosecutable offense and, in the words of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, constitutes "beyond any doubt customary law." 219 Control Council Law No. 10, which governed the USMT proceedings, itself made reference to the notion of aiding and
abetting. 220 More recently, the statutes governing the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ("Yugoslav Tribunal" and
"Rwanda Tribunal") also impose criminal responsibility upon persons who have
"planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution" of the various crimes set forth in the stat222
Arute. 221 The Tribunals also criminalize the act of complicity in genocide.
ticle 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court imposes liability
on a person who "aids, abets or otherwise assists in [the] commission or [the]
attempted commission, including providing means for [the] commission" of
specified offenses.

2 23

The Rwanda Tribunal distinguishes between aiding and abetting, noting

that aiding means giving assistance to a perpetrator whereas abetting involves
facilitating commission of a crime by being sympathetic to the act.2 24
218.

CLAPHAM AND JERBI,

supra note 40, at 3.

662,
219. See, e.g., Prosecutorv. Tadic, Case No. IT 94-1 Trial Judgment, May 7, 1997, at 919U
669, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2002).
220. Article 11(2) of Control Council Law No. 10 provided that "a person is deemed to have
committed a crime if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such
crime or ordered and or abetted the same.

221. See

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,

7, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th meeting, at Article 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/
827 (1993) amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR 53rd Sess., 3878th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/
Res/] 166 (1998); STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, ARTICLE 6,
U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3453rd Meeting, at Article 3, Um. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994). Accomplice or aidor and abettor liability has been recognized in a host of international
treaties or conventions relating to slavery, genocide, torture, apartheid and inhuman treatment. See,
e.g., SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, THE SLAVE TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY, Article 6, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (1956)
(imposing criminal liability on persons who are accessories to enslavement); CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE, Article 111(e), Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered
into force on Jan. 12, 1951 (criminal liability may be imposed on persons who are complicit in
genocide); INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
AFARTHEID, Article 111(b), G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at Article 2, U.N.
Doc A/9030 (1973) (imposing criminal liability on individual involved in directly abetting or encouraging commission of the crime of apartheid).
222. See ICTY Statute, Art. 4(3)(e); ICTR Statute, Art. 2(3)(e).
223. U.N. Doc A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www/unlorgllawl
icc.statute/romefra.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
224. See Schabas, supra note 13, at 443 (citing Prosecutorv. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Trial Judgment, Sept. 2, 1998, available at http:/Iwww.ictr.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2002)).
ART.
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There are perhaps three main requirements for the establishment of accomplice liability under international law. First, an international crime must have
been committed. Second, the accomplice must have contributed in a material
way to the crime through its action. Third, the accomplice must have intended
that the crime be committed or have been reckless as to its commission. 25
With regard to the concept of accomplice liability for someone who aids
and abets an international crime, the "intentional participation test" articulated
by the Yugoslav Tribunal in the Tadic case is instructive:
The most relevant sources for such a determination are the Niirnberg war crimes
trials, which resulted in several convictions for complicitous conduct. While the
judgments generally failed to discuss in detail the criteria upon which guilt was
determined, a clear pattern does emerge upon an examination of the relevant
cases. First, there is a requirement of intent, which involves awareness of the act
of participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. Second, the prosecution must prove that there was participation
in that
the conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of the illegal
226
act.

As to the first requirement, an accomplice can only be charged for aiding
and abetting if someone else has perpetrated an international crime. However,
this does not require the conviction of the perpetrator of the underlying crime.
In criminal law an accomplice can usually be tried for complicity in a crime
even where the principal perpetrator has not been identified or where guilt could
Moreover, the accomplice need not desire
not be proven against that principal.
22 7
the commission of the offense.
Even if the requirement of an underlying crime has been met, an accomplice must still have the requisite intent and actions. The requisite mens rea has
been described as knowledge that the acts will assist the principal in the commission of a criminal act.228 Unocal has admitted that it had knowledge of the
military's actions. Thus, there is evidence to support the contention that Unocal
knew that its investment activity, as well as its retention of government security
forces for the pipeline project, could foreseeably contribute to violations of international law.
As for the required actus reus, the Rwanda and Yugoslav Tribunals have
developed a broad understanding of what constitutes participation in the commission of a crime. According to the Yugoslav Tribunal, the actus reus required
for aiding and abetting consists of "practical assistance, encouragement or moral
support, which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime." 229 As225. See id. at 446.
226. Tadic, supra note 219, at 674.
227. See Schabas, supra note 13, at 447 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-95-0-T,
Trial Judgment, Dec. 2, 1999, at 530).
228. See Prosecutor v. Delalic ("Celibici Case"), Case No. 1T-96-21, Trial Judgment, Nov.
1998, at 326, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/index.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2002).
229. Prosecutorv. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Judgment, Dec. 10, 1998, at 249,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2002).
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sistance of any kind, including providing moral or psychological support, may
trigger culpable participation.230
In Prosecutorv. Akayesu, the Rwanda Tribunal convicted a village mayor
as an accomplice relating to certain crimes of sexual violence because his encouragement of other such acts "sent a clear signal of official tolerance for sexand
ual violence" that contributed to the offense.23 1 Moral support
232
act.
to
failed
has
defendant
a
when
found
been
also
has
encouragement
The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal has also noted, in a case involving
allegations of torture, that an accomplice's mere presence may constitute "participation" in certain circumstances. Presence may constitute complicity when it
has a significant legitimizing effect on the perpetrator's conduct. The tribunal
cited a decision of the German Supreme Court in which a high-ranking official
of the Nazi Party was tried under Control Council Law No. 10. The defendant
was convicted as an accomplice in the destruction of a synagogue due to his
presence at the crime scene, his status within the Nazi party, and his knowledge
of the criminal enterprise. The Yugoslav Tribunal stated:
An additional requirement with respect to the predicate act for accomplice liability is that it must have a "direct and substantial effect" on the commission of the
offense. 2 3 3 A "direct and substantial effect" has previously been found where a
defendant could have pursued an alternative course of conduct that would have
prevented or somehow mitigated the offense. The Yugoslav Tribunal has indicated that an accomplice's participation is substantial "if the criminal act most
probably would not have occurred in the234same way had not someone acted in the
role that the accused in fact assumed."
Assistance, however, need not constitute an "indispensable element" for the
acts of the principal.2 3 5 In the Eintzgruppen case, for example, the USMT convicted a military officer of aiding and abetting summary executions because he
had the ability to object to the executions but "chose to let the injustice go
uncorrected.

236

Do Unocal's activities in Myanmar meet the threshold for application of
accomplice liability under international law? Unocal is not alleged to have directly conscripted workers for the pipeline. Had Unocal done so, it may have
been liable for directly violating international humanitarian law or for being "directly complicit" as outlined in the categories of complicity in Part I above.
Most recently, the court appears to have applied an incorrect standard when
analyzing the conduct of Unocal with respect to forced labor. The court emphasized the issue of active participation in light of an implied defense of necessity.
199-204 (citing British Military Tribunal cases); Prosecutorv. Musema, Case
230. See id. at
No. ICTR-96-13, Trial Judgment, Jan. 27, 2000, at 126, available at http://www.ictr.org.
231. Akayesu, supra note 227, at 692-93.
232. See Prosecutorv. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Judgment, March 3, 2000, at 284,
available at http:l/www.un.orglictylblaskic/trialclljudgementlindex.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
233. Tadic, supra note 219, at 692.
234. Id. at 1 688.
235. Furundzija,supra note 229, at 1 209.
236. Trial of Otto Elmendorf and Others (Eitzgrippen Case), 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE TnE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1, 572

(1949).
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The correct inquiry, however, is whether Unocal's actions constitute aiding and
abetting under international law. The court's earlier ruling, where it refused to
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction applies a different standard that focused on Unocal's role as an accomplice. The earlier Unocal decision relating to subject matter jurisdiction applied the correct legal standard.
The court, in its earlier decision, stated:
Although there is no allegation that SLORC is physically selling Burmese citizens
to the private defendants, plaintiffs allege that, despite their knowledge of
SLORC's practice of forced labor, both in general and with respect to the pipeline
project, the private defendants have paid for and continue to pay SLORC to provide labor and security for the pipeline, essentially treating SLORC as an overseer, accepting the benefit of and approving the use of forced labor. These
the
allegations
23 7 are sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under
ATCA.

The court recognized that the doctrine of "beneficiary" complicity (i.e.
knowledge of the host government's criminal acts coupled with continued assistance that creates economic benefit for the MNC) is actionable.
Unocal knew that its actions would assist SLORC in the commission of
crimes .238 The district court found that Unocal knew that forced labor, imprisonment and executions occurred in the pipeline area.2 39 It knew that the military's
actions related to the pipeline project. Therefore, any continued support of the
military in relation to the project, whether financial or otherwise, would appear
to show that Unocal knew that its actions would further aid human rights violations. Alternatively, Unocal may have acted recklessly with respect to its agreements with the military.
The more difficult question is whether Unocal's actions are sufficient to
create accomplice liability. Can Unocal be said to have provided practical assistance, support, or encouragement to SLORC through its actions that directly and
substantially instigated the use of forced labor? More specifically, are the plaintiffs' factual allegations sufficient to support a claim of this nature?
First, it appears from the record that Unocal's alleged actions do constitute
practical assistance, support, and encouragement of the military. Unocal provided practical assistance in the form of its financial support and agreements
with the military. Unocal acknowledged that it "hired the Burmese military to
provide security for the project and pay for these through the Myanmar Oil and
soldiers
Gas Enterprise" which is government-operated. 240 Three truckloads of
24 1
accompanied project officials in their survey work and village visits.
237. Doe 1, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
238. The requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting is knowledge that the act will assist the
principal in the commission of the crime. See Furundzija,supra note 229, at 242. Knowledge has
been found where there is "a conscious decision to assist" and where the accomplice acts "accept[ing] that such assistance would be a possible and foreseeable consequence of [the] conduct."
Id. at 241; Blaskic, supra note 232, at 286.
239. See Doe I, 110 F. Supp. 2d at1306, 1310.
240. Id. at 1301.
241. See id.
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Unocal hired the Myanmar military to provide security for the pipeline and
to build supporting roads and infrastructure for the project. Unocal continued to
retain the military even after it became aware that it had committed offenses in
furtherance of the pipeline project. 242 Due to the pipeline project, SLORC is
alleged to have increased its activities in the pipeline area. The inference is that
Unocal's investment increased military presence. Company employees have
stated "[Unocal's] assertion that SLORC has not expanded and amplified its
usual methods around the pipeline on our behalf may not withstand much
scrutiny. 24 3
In furtherance of the project, the military allegedly enslaved the local population, evacuated villages, executed some resistors and engaged in other criminal
acts. Monetary support, coupled with the continued business relationship might
well rise to the level of aiding and abetting SLORC's enslavement of its citizens.
One could argue that if not for the pipeline and the income generated by Unocal,
SLORC would not have engaged in forced labor to the extent that it did.
Alternatively, Unocal was (and is) a continued and influential spectator and
knowing business partner to the Myanmar military. The company's presence
and conduct at the project site through visits and the ongoing presence of officials may also create accomplice liability if it can be shown that the MNC's
presence created a presumption that Unocal encouraged or approved of
SLORC's actions. None of these considerations factored into the district court's
reasoning.
C.

The State Action Test and InternationalLaw

The main focus of this article is on situations in which an MNC may be
held directly liable for its actions under international law. Where an MNC aids
and abets a host government in violation of a jus cogens norm, it could potentially be held liable as a private actor. For certain types of human rights violations, however, the MNC must be deemed a state actor and therefore acting
under color of law. This segment of the article briefly discusses the Unocal
court's analysis of the state action requirement and suggests alternative approaches to this requirement. As noted above, the Unocal court also dismissed
plaintiff's physical violence and forced relocation claims. It did so after finding
that Unocal was not a joint actor as defined by U.S. precedent, including Gallagher. The following discussion briefly sets forth ideas that will be developed
more fully in a future article.
The issue of whether an MNC (or an individual) has acted in collaboration
with a state actor in commission of certain crimes such as torture, rape, and
forced displacement should be decided based on principles of international law.
In this sense, it would be more appropriate for U.S. courts to look to international precedent, rather than U.S. precedent with respect to state action.2 4 In
242. See id. at 1306, 1310.
243. Id. at 1300.
244. See Craig Forcese, Note, ATCA 's Achilles Heel: CorporateComplicity, InternationalLaw
and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 509-10 (2000).
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due course, international tribunals, other national courts, and international and
national lawmakers may also grapple with the problem of MNC complicity.
Such groups will need to develop standards and tests based more on international experience. One of the main thrusts of this article is that American or
ATCA jurisprudence alone should not be the basis for crafting theories of MNC
responsibility or liability.
The Unocal court, relying on Gallagher, also seems to have devoted considerable attention to whether Unocal conspired with the military to engage in
the unlawful acts of forcible displacement of villagers, and the violence that
accommodated the displacement and forced conscription of the villagers for labor. In doing so, the court treats this as a situation like Gallagher,where the
relationship between the state actor and the private actor is isolated, not continuous. There is no assessment of whether the joint action between Unocal and
SLORC over a period of time caused the unlawful conduct to occur. The Gallagher test is not instructive when trying to understand the interrelationship between an MNC and a host government or its security forces. Such a relationship
exists on a continuum and consists of multiple acts and omissions.24 5
The Unocal court also noted that, for liability to be imposed, Unocal's actions must have been proximately caused of the alleged human rights violations.
In doing so, the court focused on whether Unocal had some control or power
over SLORC that would have resulted in the harm. 2 4 6 An alternative reading of
the proximate cause requirement would have focused on whether Unocal's actions could foreseeably have caused the human rights violations.2 47
Various U.S. cases examining the state action question have looked to see
whether one party initiated a process or set in motion a series of acts that resulted in harmful conduct. The harmful or unlawful conduct, of course, was
required to have been a reasonably foreseeable outcome of the original actions.
Applying a test of reasonable forseeability, one can quite plausibly argue that
Unocal should have foreseen that its hiring of the military to provide security
and to assist in creating infrastructure for the pipeline would result in human
rights violations.
More generally, the Unocal decision does not adequately address the issue
of how to develop appropriate standards with respect to MNC liability or, in the
absence of liability, at least responsibility for acts of violence committed by a
245. See id. at 513.
246. See id. at 506.
247. Alternative precedent suggests that an analysis of forseeability is appropriate when analyzing proximate cause in the context of state action under Section 1983. See, e.g., Tidwell v.
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 1982) (cert. denied, 61 U.S. 905 (1983)) (state did not have
control over the procedures but it was sufficient that the state was responsible for initiating process
that culminated in the harmful act; agency "set in motion a series of acts when the [agency] knew or
should have known that a constitutional injury was the only reasonable outcome.); Johnson v. Duffy,
588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (requisite causal connection can be established ... also "by
setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would
cause others to inflict this constitutional injury); Tahoe PreservationCouncil v. Tahoe, 216 F.3d 765
(9th Cir. 2000) (forseeability analysis an appropriate part of proximate cause determinations).

148

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:91

host government in furtherance of a joint venture. There are alternative sources
of law for developing clearer standards.
First, alternative tests exist under international law. For example, under
international law, a state is responsible for the actions of agents undertaken on
the state's behalf. In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslav
Tribunal stated: "The requirement of international law for the attribution to
states of facts performed by private individuals is that the State exercises control
over the individuals." 24 8 The notion of state responsibility relates to when a
state might be responsible for the actions of private actors. If such a doctrine is
applied in the MNC context, it must be inverted so that an MNC is liable for the
acts of the host state's military where the MNC exercised control over the military units that committed human rights violations. 2 4 9 Thus, one possible analysis is to ask to what extent a host government delegates to any MNC functions
traditionally performed by the government. If the MNC stands in the shoes of
the state, it could be deemed a state actor.
Second, plaintiffs alleged that Unocal satisfied the joint action test by virtue
of its joint venture with SLORC. Merely alleging that a joint venture exists
should not trigger state action in a case involving MNC-government partnership.
However, the court could have examined the nature of the joint venture itself to
determine whether Unocal had acted under color of law. If courts, as well as
policymakers and activists, want to develop clearer guidelines for MNCs
(whether binding or non-binding), they also need to examine the contractual
structures that give rise to such partnerships.
Therefore, as an alternative to the "joint action" test, it may be appropriate
to develop a "joint venture" test for purposes of evaluating whether an MNC has
conspired or aided and abetted a host government. Questions or factors that are
relevant to this inquiry include the structure of the business relationship or the
joint venture, the level of control exercised by both parties (in terms of ownership in the joint venture and directors for the investment vehicle), the level of
profit sharing from the activity, and the types of concessions granted to the
MNC by the government as part of the investment process.
Third, an alternative to the U.S "joint action" text articulated in Gallagher,
is a nexus/symbiotic relationship test. Under this test, plaintiffs must establish
that "where there is a symbiotic relationship between the State and a privately
owned enterprise, so that the State and a privately owned enterprise are [participants in a joint venture, the actions of the private enterprise may be attributable
to the State."'250 The threshold for establishing a symbiotic relationship is high
and courts have required that each
party (the state and the private actor) benefit
25 1
from the wrongful act itself.
248. Id. at 508 (citing Tadic, supra note 219).
249. See Forcese, supra note 244, at 508 (citing Tadic, supra note 219).
250. Id. at 503 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 847 (1982) (Marshall, J. dissenting), referring to doctrine outlined in Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
251. See id. at 503.
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Given that MNC-host government relationships are often long-term ventures, the nexus test may be more apt for analyzing whether state action is present. The nexus/symbiotic relationship test could itself serve as the basis for
developing a joint venture test that permits an analysis of the underlying business relationship between the parties.
D. Extending Beneficiary Complicity Beyond Unocal
Can one extend a notion of beneficiary complicity to other situations? For
certain violations of international humanitarian law, the publicity of certain war
crimes and atrocities may be sufficient to establish mens rea of an MNC. As an
example, one commentator has noted that the publicity of war crimes and atrocities in Sierra Leone, by the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations and the press, would permit a court to conclude that "diamond traders,
arms suppliers and so on, have knowledge of
airline pilots and executives, small252
their contribution to the conflict."
However, the question remains, how far could one cast the accomplice's
net? For example, could one prosecute the diamond vendor that trades with
combatants in Angola or Sierra Leone? On the other hand, what about the bank
that provides a loan to the diamond merchant who purchases the stones from the
trader? This is where the court needs to examine the relationship between the
MNC or business entity involved.
This article advocates extension of accomplice liability only when the
MNC is actively investing in the host country and is providing assistance to the
state through its investment activities.Both the intention and the action of an
MNC must be viewed over time. The Second World War cases involved forced
labor and other criminal activity that did stretch over several years. The end of
the war, however, curtailed the duration.
Today, when assessing accomplice liability, it is important to assess the
level of knowledge possessed by the MNC at the point of its entry into a host
state. MNCs should be encouraged to engage in human rights risk assessment
prior to investing in a country where there is corruption or repression emanating
from the state. It is relevant to any inquiry about accomplice liability to deterrelationship and
mine what knowledge existed at the beginning of a business
253
then, what knowledge was acquired by the MNC over time.
252. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 13, at 450-51 ("Given the intense publicity about war crimes
and other atrocities in Sierra Leone, made known not only in specialized documents such as those
issued by the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations, but also by the
popular media, a court ought to have little difficulty in concluding that diamond traders, airline pilots
and executives, small arms suppliers and so on, have knowledge of their contribution to the conflict
and to the offences being committed.").
253. One proposal for the creation of a statutory cause of action for situations similar to Unocal
suggests that MNCs should be penalized when they engage with a foreign affiliate (e.g., a foreign
host government or its agents) in a business enterprise where the foreign affiliate "was predisposed
to commit one or more human rights violations in furtherance of that enterprise when the agreement
with it was reached." The same proposal defines "predisposed" as when the foreign affiliate has
committed a human rights violation in the past and an MNC's "reasonable inquiry into the affiliate's
past would have uncovered as much." The proposal, however, is limited to situations in which the
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Let us assume that knowledge can be demonstrated, either through specific
admissions or because (as in the case of Sierra Leone, for example) human
rights abuses are publicly documented by reputable sources. A second question
will remain as to how the MNC continues to act when it has acquired knowledge. Unocal is alleged to have known that SLORC had a history of human
rights violations (amounting to violations of customary international law) when
it entered into an agreement asking SLORC to clear the pipeline route. Despite
this prior knowledge, Unocal is alleged to have provided financial assistance to
SLORC and to have continued to contract with the military.2 54
Moreover, the definition of aiding and abetting under international law requires that the accomplice's act constitute "substantial assistance." "Substantial," at least with respect to an MNC, involves collaboration with the host
government. Factors that are important in assessing whether the assistance is
substantial include duration of the investment activity, duration of knowledge of
the human rights violations, nature of the assistance to the host state (such as
financial assistance), contractual agreements, and collaboration in a business
venture. Substantial assistance should involve not only individual actions that
are large in magnitude or scope, but continuous actions or presence that become
substantial by virtue of their duration.
The substantial assistance requirement coupled with an examination of the
relationship between an MNC and the host government suggests that courts
must engage in some sort of proximate cause analysis. There needs to be a
tangible nexus between the MNC conduct and the human rights violations.
This article advocates encompassing beneficiary complicity within the
scope of accomplice liability for MNCs. This would mean that an MNC's
knowledge of ongoing human rights violations, combined with its acceptance of
direct economic benefit arising from the violations and continued partnership
with a host government, could give rise to accomplice liability. As noted in Part
I, however, there still remains a distinction between crimes for which an MNC
might be liable as an accomplice and crimes for which the MNC must act in
collaboration with the state to establish state action.
For war crimes, crimes against humanity, piracy, enslavement, and similar
crimes, an MNC can be either directly liable or liable as an accomplice. For
crimes such as torture, rape, and forcible displacement, the MNC must collaborate with the state under color of state law. To date, this concept is ambiguous
and has been made perhaps more so by the application of American law.
For purposes of establishing liability, an MNC should be liable if the state
has delegated its functions to the MNC such that the MNC acts as an agent of
the government or performs governmental functions in its stead. As an alternative, a test as to whether a nexus or joint venture exists between the MNC and
MNC contracts with a non-subsidiary affiliate. This proposal may be limited in its utility but provides an example of how one might begin to think about the issue of knowledge in the context of
accomplice liability. See David I. Beker, Note, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine,
32 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 183, 202-05 (1998).
254. See Unocal , 863 F. Supp. at 885.
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the state may be appropriate. Such a joint venture test would examine the nature
of the business relationship between the parties and also assesses the MNC's
conduct with respect to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the MNC's
actions would lead to the relevant crimes.
Ultimately, it may prove more difficult to ascribe accomplice liability in
situations where an MNC has acted in concert with the state in the commission
of an offense. How does this affect the theory of beneficiary complicity? At a
minimum, guidelines and codes of conduct dealing with MNC complicity
should prohibit beneficiary complicity irrespective of the class of crime. An
MNC should not aid a host state or its agents in violating international lawwhether the crime is enslavement or torture and physical violence. Therefore,
defining complicity to encompass direct as well as beneficiary complicity is
important.
VI.
FUTURE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR MULTINATIONALS:

EXTENDING THE PINOCHET PHENOMENON TO MNCs

If individuals are capable of engaging in certain egregious violations of
international law, why does it surprise us to think that legal persons, such as
255
As discussed above,
MNCs, may likewise be implicated in such violations?
255. While many countries are able to prosecute individuals for crimes committed abroad, governments have been reluctant, historically, to prosecute a corporation in a home jurisdiction (e.g.,
where the MNC is incorporated) for crimes committed overseas in a host state, but this is changing.
See Theodore Meron, Is InternationalLaw Moving Towards Criminalization?,9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1
(1998), available at http://www.ejil.org/journalVol91Nol/art2.html#TopofPage (last visited Oct. 9,
2001).
With respect to the dichotomy between a state's prosecution of individuals versus corporations,
one commentator has asked the question in this fashion:
The more consensus there is of a common international interest in a specific form of
legal sanction with respect to specific subject mater, the more this will count in favor
of the acceptability of extraterritorial regulation. The point at which a consensus
becomes so widespread and clear that states are no longer simply permitted to regulate a matter but required to do so is the point at which we move from the realm of
state jurisdiction to state obligation-i.e., to state responsibility which is incurred
when a state fails to provide for jurisdiction in its domestic law and to exercise it
where the triggering facts are present. For example, normative discourse has
progressed to the point with respect to the problem of child sex tourism that some
states, such as Canada and Australia, have made it a criminal offence for their nationals to have "sex" with children anywhere in the world. Little, if any protest, from
states afflicted by the sex-tourism trade, such as Thailand and Sri Lanka has occurred,
and the debate has rapidly gone to another level. The real question now is not
whether states are permitted to regulate their nationals' conduct but whether they
have a duty to do so as an extension of their duty to ensure human rights ... However, the truly interesting question ... is whether two variants on the just-described
sex-tourism regulations would meet with the same general acquiescance [sic]. The
first variation would be to take the regulation out of the context of criminal law
sanctions over individual tourists and extend the regulation to some form of regulation of corporate behavior (e.g., civil liability regime) with respect to those national
travel agencies and national tour operators that deliberately facilitate such tours. The
second variation would be to see if regulation, whether criminal or corporate, could
be justified beyond a nationality basis for that jurisdiction. That is to say, if Australia
began to allow civil suits against Japanese corporate sex-tour operators organizing
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the USMT, after Nuremberg, did find that corporate entities had violated certain
laws of war, although the statute of the Tribunal did not permit the prosecution
of legal persons. Since Nuremberg, there has been an emerging practice among
states to impute criminal responsibility to corporations-albeit in different manners, sometimes through regulatory statutes and at other times through the direct
application of general penal laws. At the same time, certain international treaties, relating to issues such as bribery and corruption and hazardous wastes, create avenues for the prosecution of MNCs by domestic courts.
Corporations can commit international crimes and thus corporations can
potentially be tried nationally. The U.S. slave labor cases brought under the
ATCA, coupled with the renewed focus on the trials of the industrialists, provide
us with a richer understanding of the prohibition on the use of slave labor as a
peremptory norm of international law. Moreover, these cases highlight the possible role of the private corporation with respect to forced labor.
Nonetheless, there remains a question as to whether MNCs might be criminally accountable in national courts for such offenses. 25 6 Other nations do not
have the benefit of a statute such as the ATCA. 257 This last section explores
some of the reasoning behind the application of international criminal law to
situations in which MNCs violate the law of nations by engaging in the knowing
trips to Bangkok or Phuket, would Japan and Thailand accept this as a reasonable
exercise of extraeterroritorial jurisdiction?
Craig Scott, Translating Torture into TransnationalTort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in TORTURE As TORT, 56 (Scott ed., 2000).
256. A few commentators have begun to discuss the applicability of universal jurisdiction or
international criminal law to situations in which corporations commit crimes that constitute violations of the law of nations. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, supra note 14, at 141 ("[W]e can therefore
consider that corporations commit international crimes, including war crimes and that these corporations may be tried, in some circumstances outside the jurisdiction where the crime took place. In
other words, the 'Pinochet phenomenon' is applicable in the sphere of corporate international
crimes.); Menno Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi, Introduction, in LIAaILrY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 12, at 8 (noting that "MNCs are prohibited
from engaging directly or indirectly in violations of jus cogens principles (such as the prohibition of
slavery and forced labour, genocide and torture, extrajudicial murder, piracy, crimes against humanity, and apartheid")); Muthucumaraswamy Somarahaj, Linking State Responsibility for Certain
Harms Caused by Corporate Nationals Abroad to Civil Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home
States, in TORTURE As TORT, supra note 255, at 492 ("It is equally clear that there is jurisdiction for
any domestic court of any state to prosecute the multinational corporation if the allegation relates to
a violation of a jus cogens norm like the prohibition of torture." ); Schabas, supra note 13, at 454;
Stephens, supra note 12, at 209. Stephens does not mention universal jurisdiction but states: "potential enforcement actions [against MNCs] include complaints to international agencies, as well as a
range of civil and criminal proceedings in domestic courts, on behalf of both public and private
plaintiffs." For a civil law perspective, see ArIrAc, THE Acrivrrms OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (SEMINAR CONCLUSIONS) (2001), available at http://www.attac.orglfraltoil/doc/cetim2en.htm

(last visited Oct. 13, 2001). Among the seminar's conclusions was the statement that "national
tribunals can receive claims and requests against Transnational Companies and their managers . . .
Those making the claim have the option . ..to apply the increasingly widespread principle of
universal jurisdiction."
257. For an argument regarding the extension of ATCA principles to other jurisdictions see
John Terry, Taking Filartiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside the United States Should Accept
Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving Torture Committed Abroad, in TORTURE As TORT, supra note

255, at 109-33.
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use of, for example, forced labor. To date, this argument has been purely academic, because such a prosecution has never occurred.
Criminal liability may be more feasible than civil litigation, given the need
for a proper statute conferring jurisdiction in the civil context. Moreover, since
criminal prosecution requires a much higher burden of proof than civil cases,
states would have to satisfy a higher evidentiary threshold. Finally, criminal
sanctions for egregious violations of international law may have a greater deterrent effect than civil lawsuits. Paying a civil fine is much less stigmatizing than
a criminal conviction and penalty.
Under the universality principle, the jurisdiction of a national court does
not depend on where an offense occurred, or on the nationality of the defendant.
Jurisdiction is not limited by territorial boundaries where basic human rights are
violated. Rather, the nature of the offense confers jurisdiction on all states. Offenses that have been described as giving rise to universal jurisdiction include
piracy, slave trading, war crimes, crimes against humanity (that are part of systematic conduct), genocide, and torture.25 8
The most recent example of an exercise of universal jurisdiction relates to
the decision of the United Kingdom (UK) authorities to arrest General Pinochet
and to consider his extradition to Spain. 2 59 The UK's action generated criticism
of the use of universal jurisdiction, but much of the adverse commentary may
court trying Pinochet, rather
relate to the political consequences of a foreign
2 60
than the legality of a jurisdiction doing so.
Some commentators have argued that a concept of universal civil jurisdiction might also be implied by virtue of the status of torture and slavery as jus
cogens and erga omnes norms. Many treaties and standards of customary international law provide the basis for imposing liability on MNCs in national
258.

See KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

PARADIGM, at 163 (Duke 1990). The basis for such a list of breaches of international law arise from
documents such as the Nuremberg Principles as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
and multilateral treaties such as the Geneva Convention on the Laws of War. See The Flick Case,
supra note 50; The Krupp Case, supra note 52; The I.G. Farben Case, supra note 53.
259. See Sonorajah, supra note 256, at 492 (citing the judgment of Lord Millet in the Pinochet
case. Millet argued for universal jurisdiction in situations of torture, even absent any law incorporating norms prohibiting torture into domestic law); see also, A. Bianchi, Immunity versus Human
Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT. L. 2 (1999), available at http://www.ejil.org/journall
VollI0/No2/artl.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002). These two executives are each alleged to have
"participated in, directed and/or authorized the tortuous conduct resulting from the unlawful conspiracy between Unocal, Total, [Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise] (MOGE) and [Burmese State Law
and Order Restoration Council] (SLORC) or... specifically knew or reasonably should have known
that some hazardous conditions or activity under his control could injure plaintiffs and negligently
failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the harm ... Plaintiffs Compl. For Damages and

Injunctive Declaratory Relief, Doe v. Unocal, (C.D. Cal. 1996) (Civ. 96-6959), 9N 15-16. A second
suit was filed against Unocal in September 1996 by supporters of opposition leader and Nobel Peace
Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was elected in 1992, but who was prevented
from taking office by military rulers who had seized control of the country several years previously.
See Dissidents of Myanmar File Rights Suit Against Unocal Energy; They accused the firm of violations, money laundering through the pipeline project, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at D2.
260.

See. e.g., Scott, Introduction, in TORTURE AS TORT, supra note 255, at 5, n. 9.
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26

' For example, the USMT was able to use treaty language to determine
that IG Farben had violated the laws of war.
Slavery constitutes a jus cogens and erga omnes norm in public international law. Erga omnes obligations refer to certain obligations that flow to all
states from general principles of international law and international instruments
of universal or quasi-universal characteristics. 26 2 Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms accepted and recognized by the international community as a whole.
No derogation from jus cogens norms is permitted.263
Jus cogens norms are derived from basic concerns about human dignity and
this includes the most fundamental human rights protections, such as protection
from torture and slavery. According to some commentators, there is enough
evidence in international law that shows that the prevention of slavery qualifies
as a higher obligation that would trigger the principle of universal jurisdiction.
The prevention of torture and slavery is the specific subject of multilateral treaties such as the Convention Against Torture. 264 The prohibition on slave trading
and slavery is likewise found in multiple international treaties and
instruments.2 65
More generally, there are examples in which national jurisdiction attaches
to international crimes committed by MNCs. 266 In addition, states whose national criminal law permits prosecution of legal persons may be able to extend
such jurisdiction to international crimes. Different jurisdictions have permitted
courts.

261. See Scott, Translating Torture into TransnationalTort, in TORTURE AS TORT, supra note
255, at 57 ("A central tension stems from the necessity to take seriously the following question:
given the state of international law on the applicability of human rights norms to corporate actors,
should judges assume the authority to develop such accountability without express or at least clear
authorization from the relevant legislature? The question is bound up with the general question of
justiciability and the associated debates on the relative competence and legitimacy of courts and
legislatures in relation to law-creation activity.").
262. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power company, Ltd., (1970) IC.J. Rep. at 3.
263. See Article 64 of the VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 23 May 1969 (entered into forced January 2, 1980) which states: "If a new peremptory norm of general international
law emerges any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates."
All jus cogens norms are also erga omnes but erga omnes may include more than jus cogens norms.
264. See CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PUNISHMENT, adopted December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46 U.N. GAOR 9th Session, Supp.

No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985). Reprinted in (1984) 23 I.L.M. 1027.
265. See SLAVERY CONVErNITION, September 25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17, INTERNATIONAL; LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION (No. 29) CONCERNING FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR, June 28,
1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND THE
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY, September 7, '957, 266
U.N.T.S. 3; INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION (No. 105) CONCERNING THE ABOSLAVE TRADE AND

LMON OF FORCED LABOR, June 25, 1957; INTERNATIONAL

COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL

RIGHTS, adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res 2200 (XXI). U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
266. THE BAMAKO CONVENTION ON THE BAN AND IMPORT INTO AFRICA AND THE CONTROL OF
TRANSEOUNDARY WASTES WITHIN AFRICA has been cited often as an example of a treaty that demands that countries adopt legislation "for imposing criminal penalties on all persons who have
planned, committed, or assisted in such illegal imports. Such penalties should be sufficiently high to
both punish and deter such conduct." January 29, 1991 reprinted in 30 I.L.M. (1991) at 793. The

Convention defines person as "any natural or legal person"; see also the BASEL

CONVENTION ON THE

CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL,

28 I.L.M. 657.

(1989)
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legal persons to be tried for criminal offenses under varying standards, and have
grappled with different tests for attributing actions of employees/agents to the
corporate entity. The failure in some jurisdictions to proceed with prosecutions
relate to prosecutorial restraint
of corporate manslaughter or negligent homicide
267
rather than a sense that it is not permissible.
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Law
Commission (ILC) to study the desirability of establishing a criminal chamber
for the International Court of Justice. Neither this nor the international penal
tribunal described in the 1948 Genocide Convention ever came to fruition. The
project to establish an international criminal court was not reexamined until
1992 when the U.N. General Assembly directed the ILC to prepare a draft statute for an international criminal court. The ILC adopted a draft in 1994. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly set up an ad hoc committee to review the
ILC draft. In 1996, a preparatory committee met. After five additional meetings, a draft statute was submitted to the United Nations Diplomatic Conference
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) in Rome. The
final text of the statute was adopted on July 17, 1998.268
At the Rome Conference, the draft statute under consideration included
bracketed text that would give the ICC jurisdiction over natural and legal persons. 2 6 9 The French delegation was responsible for the proposal to include legal
persons within the jurisdiction of the ICC. France is a jurisdiction that recog267. See WELLS, supra note 17. For a discussion of the various theories with respect to attribution of liability for corporate crime see B. Fisse and J. Braithewaite, The Allocation of Responsibility
for CorporateCrimes, II SYDNEY L. REv. 468 (1988).
There is no single accepted theory for attributing criminal liability to corporations. Some of the
hurdles faced with respect to imputing liability to a legal person include the problem of imputing the
acts of a natural person to a corporation. Common law systems have resolved this difficulty either
by adopting vicarious liability or by identification of the acts of those representing the corporate
"mind" or "will" as acts of the corporation (i.e., attribution). See, e.g., L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL
LiAnmirry oF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 4-5 (1969); Civil law jurisdictions have responded by

enacting legislation that provides for the application of specific penal laws to legal persons.
A second difficulty is when a crime includes specific intent in its definition. It is a conceptual
impediment in any legal system to accept that a legal person can have mens rea for purposes of
criminal prosecution. Some jurisdictions attribute the acts and mens rea of the employee to the
corporation.
Under a related principle known as the identification principle, the liability of a corporation is
limited to the actions of its policymaking officials. In the United Kingdom, this has been referred to
as the directing mind doctrine. See H.L Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. Graham & Sons Ltd.,
(1957) 1 Q.B. Other impediments have related to the doctrine of ultra vires, also referred to as the
doctrine of declared aims. Under this doctrine, a corporation is formally limited to those acts that
are expressly authorized in its corporate charter. Because corporate charters only permit companies
to engage in lawful acts, the corporation lacks any power to commit unlawful acts. Thus, illegal acts
committed by employees incur liability for the individual only.
268. The statute was adopted by a non-recorded vote with 120 votes in favor, 7 votes against,
and 21 abstentions. See UN Press Release LROM 12 July 1998.
269. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.I at p. 49. Article 23 paras 5 and 6 read:
The Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of
States, when the crimes committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons or
by their agencies or representatives.
The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators.
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nizes legal responsibility for legal persons. 2 7 0 France further believed that crimdeclared illegal at Nuremberg should likewise
inal organizations such as2 7 those
1
be outlawed by the ICC.
Despite various attempts to create an acceptable formulation that would
include legal persons within the ICC's jurisdiction, it proved impossible to reach
a consensus within the short time of the Rome Conference and therefore the
French withdrew the proposal.272 The disagreements turned on issues such as
devising rules of attribution (with respect to the knowledge and culpability of a
legal person) and highlighted the importance of creating a way to deal with
corporate war crimes.27 3
The ICC statute can be amended, at the earliest, seven years after it comes
into force. According to Article 123, at that time, a review conference will be
convened to consider amendments. Any amendments will require a consensus
of the states that are parties to the statute, or a two-thirds majority if consensus is
not possible.2 74 While it seems that states can exercise criminal jurisdiction
over MNCs either within a home or host state for violations of human rights,
they often are not willing to do so. It is therefore increasingly important to
develop mechanisms for encouraging them to do so. Amending the statute of
the ICC to include legal persons is one way to accomplish what individual states
are reluctant to do.2 7 5 Nonetheless, this proposition is likely to face resistance
from governments where large MNCs are domiciled. Attempts by some nation
states to create a workable proposal suggests that the jurisdiction over legal persons is an issue deserving further consideration at the international level. If the
ICC is not given general jurisdiction over legal persons, it may be more realistic
for binding obligations to be created by virtue of treaties goveming the conduct
of MNCs.
270. See Clapham, supra note 14, at 146.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 157.
273. See id. at 140. Clapham notes that in addition to discussions relating to the activities of
corporations during the Second World War:
[v]arious delegations pointed to the possible involvement of construction companies
in covering up mass graves and several delegates referred to the role of the radio
station that had urged the killing of Tutsis during the Rwanda genocide. The representative of Tanzania made a reference to coffee companies in Rwanda that had assisted in the genocide by storing arms and equipment. The involvement of
multinational oil companies in population transfers and acts of violence in other countries were also sometimes considered.
Id. at 148.
274.

See id. at 159.

275.

See Francois Rigaux, An International (Criminal) Courtfor Transnational Companies?

2001 ATrAc SEMINAR ON THE Acrivrrs OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, available at http://

www.attac.org/fra/toil/doc/cetim7en.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); see also, Amanda Macdonald,
Hilke Molenaar, Peter Pennartz, Controlling CORPORATE WRONGS: THE LIABIrrY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS.

LEGAL POSSIBILITIES, INITIATIVES AND STRATEGIES FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.

(The IRENE Report of 2000) at 10 located at http://www.elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/ issue/2000-1/
irene.html. This report summarized major findings from a seminar sponsored by the International
Restructuring Education network at the University of Warwick in March 2000.
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VII.
CONCLUSION

The Farben and Nippon Mining prosecutions provide a starting point for
understanding the nature of individual responsibility, but also corporate responsibility, for grave breaches of international law. The effect of these cases, as
well as of the recent World War II forced labor lawsuits, are that they have
brought these issues to the attention of judges and jurists. Post-Nuremberg, the
role of the industrialists was not the focus of many legal scholars' attention,
especially in relation to the liability of legal persons.The renewed focus on restitution for World War II forced laborers, after more than fifty years, has caused
scholars to reexamine these historically significant documents. Their relevance
is clear as demonstrated by the Unocal decision. These cases have served to
solidify the jurisdictional basis for suing MNCs in the United States and arguably could provide a similar foundation for establishing criminal (and perhaps
even civil) jurisdiction in other countries.
At present, none of the recent MNC cases have been successful. The Holocaust related cases were dismissed on grounds of nonjusticiability, and also because the statute of limitations, according to the court, had expired. Very
recently, civilian slave labor cases against Japanese MNCs were also dismissed
because the applicable statutes of limitations were held to have run out. In both
sets of litigation, the courts recognized, however, that plaintiffs had plausible
causes of action against the MNCs for their use of slave labor during World War
II. Thus, the procedural reasons for dismissal should not diminish the impact of
the courts' findings in either case. Moreover, both the German and Korean
cases can be construed as prompting settlement, thus opening possibilities for
restitution to the victims.
With Unocal, the court held that mere knowledge of the use of slave labor
by Unocal's business partner (the Myanmar military government) and acceptance of economic benefits were insufficient to give rise to a cause of action.
The court, in rendering its decision, relied heavily on a brief reading of decisions
of the USMT prosecution of several German industrialists with ties to the Third
Reich. The court's analysis for many reasons, is flawed in that it ignores the
distinction between wartime economic activity and foreign investment decisions
made by MNCs today. The contradictory decisions with respect to the notions
of beneficial complicity as well as aidor and abettor liability, also provide problematic guidance concerning the parameters of corporate complicity. The Unocal court at least implicitly recognized that forced labor claims against MNCs
are possible.
The United Nations Subcomission on the Promotion and the Protection of
Human Rights is drafting a comprehensive Human Rights Code for Companies.
This is the only inter-governmental initiative, at present, that has the possibility
of working its way through the United Nations bureaucracy to become either a
binding convention ratified by states or a non-binding but legally authoritative
document, which at least states clearly MNCs' human rights obligations. Such a
code would be an explicit recognition of the obligations that exist implicitly in
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many of the existing international conventions, documents, and judgments.27 6
The guidelines, as well as any similar type of regional or multilateral initiative,
should clearly state that beneficial corporate complicity is prohibited.
This evolution of criminal law coupled with the precedent delineating
which precepts of international law apply to private actors means that states
might well be more daring in their exercise of criminal jurisdiction over MNCs.
The Pinochet case was a bold move with respect to the exercise of universal
jurisdiction against a natural person. The extension of such jurisdiction to
MNCs may seem far-fetched, but is arguably permissible under existing international law.277
Moreover, there may be other bases, including the ATCA and foreign direct liability under a tort theory of a parent corporation's breach of duty through
its investments overseas that may also create civil liability in the United States
and potentially other jurisdictions. Kent Greenfield has recently written an interesting article stating that American shareholders may be able to seek injunctive relief against American MNCs for violations of customary international
law.27 8 His argument is based on the principle that norms of customary international law apply equally to legal persons and natural persons, at least in the
United States. In addition, the law of the United States historically has incorporated international law. Therefore, he argues, corporations should be held, as a
matter of domestic company law, to a duty to uphold customary international
law, including the prohibition on forced labor. Crucial to any of these possible
causes of action is an understanding of what constitutes accomplice liability.
While MNCs are responsible for positive results such as foreign investment, capital flow, and job creation, they sometimes have been responsible for
human rights abuses such as the use of child labor, failure to provide safe and
healthy working environments, and repression of the formation of trade unions. 279 Although the problems of MNC violations of human rights should not

be overstated, it is those exceptional cases implicating an MNC, in which the
law should not remain silent.
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This article has examined some of the original decisions that attributed
criminal responsibility to private economic actors, and, by implication, to the
corporate entities for which they worked. It is hard to imagine that the judges
who comprised the various military tribunals after the Second World War would
believe that their words and judgments would have so much relevance today,
especially with respect to the liability and intent of economic actors. The rationale for prosecuting MNCs as accomplices may be more ambitious than states
with large commercial and financial interests are willing to be. The focus on
corporate complicity is a new phenomenon. To the extent that corporate actors
reflect on the potential for liability and the basis for such liability under established precepts of international law, then international law will have successfully
achieved its goal of deterrence.

